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FAMILY VALUES AND THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE: A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE 
BANKRUPTCY BENEFITS AWARDED ON THE 
BASIS OF MARITAL STATUS 
A. Meclzele Dickerson* 
INTRODUCTION 
CONGRESS recently passed a law that states that only persons of the opposite sex who are in marriages authorized by the State are 
entitled to federal benefits awarded to married persons. Specifically, 
the "Defense of Marriage Act" provides that, for the purposes of any 
federal act, ruling, or regulation, marriage means a "legal union be-
tween one man and one woman as husband and wife" and spouse 
means "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."1 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of 
William and Mary. A.B., Harvard-Radcliffe {1984); J.D., Harvard Law School (1988). 
I am grateful to Dean Nancy Rapoport, Professors Peter Alexander, Stuart R. Cohn, 
and Marjorie Girth and my faculty colleagues, Peter Alces, Neal Devins, Cynthia 
Ward, and Richard Williamson for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
This project would not have been possible without research assistance provided by 
Robert Chandler, Tanya Powell, and Beth Benko and Felicia A. Burton's cheerful 
word processing support. This project was supported, in part, by a grant provided by 
the College of William and Mary. 
1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 {1996). Congress passed this 
Act when it appeared that Hawaii might allow gay couples to obtain marriage 
licenses. The Hawaii legislature ultimately refused to allow same-sex marriages and 
subsequently adopted legislation similar to the Defense of Marriage Act. See Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (Supp. 1998) (defining marriage contract as one "between a man 
and a woman"). Other states followed suit and passed similar statutes. See, e.g., Ark. 
Code Ann.§ 9-11-109 (Michie Supp. 1998) (defining marriage as only between a man 
and a woman and declaring void all marriages between persons of the same sex); Fla. 
Stat. Ann.§ 741.212 (3) (West 1997) (e:ll:plaining that "the term 'marriage' means only 
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and \vife, and the term 
'spouse' applies only to a member of such a union"); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-3.1(a) 
(Supp. 1998) ("It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union 
only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited 
in this state."); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 89 (West 1997) ("Persons of the same sex may 
not contract marriage \vith each other."); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.1 (West 
Supp. 1998) ("Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a wo-
man. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, 
supporting, and protecting that unique relationship in order to promote, among other 
goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted 
between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state."); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1704 (West Supp. 1998) ("It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding 
public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one 
woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in an-
other state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in 
this Commonwealth."). 
In response to the possibility that a sister state might allow same-sex couples to 
marry, North Dakota passed contingent legislation. See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-03-01, 
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While courts or agencies who interpret federal acts, including the 
Bankruptcy Code ("The Code"),2 are now required to recognize only 
heterosexual marriages authorized by a state, it is unclear why federal 
bankruptcy benefits should be granted based on marital status. En-
couraging, supporting, and protecting marriage is not one of the goals 
of federal bankruptcy laws. Instead, bankruptcy laws have two pri-
mary goals: to give honest debtors a financial "fresh start" in life, and 
to ensure that creditors receive maximum, equitable debt repayment.3 
These objectives are implemented through the Code's statutory 
framework, which is designed to govern a debtor's current and future 
relationship with third-party creditors. Generally speaking, the 
Code's framework helps individual debtors either to restructure and 
repay some of their debts in Chapter 134 or to discharge debts in 
Chapter 7.5 
In its rush to vilify same sex unions,6 Congress failed to explain why 
any federal benefits should be granted based simply on a person's de-
cision (or ability) to marry. A married person who files a bankruptcy 
petition receives the following benefits simply because of marital sta-
tus: the right to file a joint petition;7 the ability (under some circum-
stances) to shield certain property from the reach of creditors;8 the 
right to budget for expenses for a "dependent" non-debtor spouse;9 
-08 (1997) (defining spouse as a "person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife" 
only if another state recognizes marriages between people of the same sex). 
2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
3. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994). 
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330. 
5. See id. §§ 706-728. Individuals can also use Chapter 11 to restructure and re-
pay debts if their combined debt exceeds Chapter 13's eligibility limits. See id. 
§ 109(e). Business debtors may liquidate under Chapter 7 and may reorganize or 
liquidate under Chapter 11. See id. §§ 101(41), 109(b), 1123(a)(5)(D). 
6. For example, during the debate on the Defense of Marriage Act, Senator Jesse 
Helms (R-NC) made the following statement: "[I]nch by inch, little by little, the ho-
mosexual lobby has chipped away at the moral stamina of some of America's courts 
and some legislators, in order to create the shaky ground that exists today that 
prompts this legislation being the subject of debate .... " 142 Cong. Rec. S10,068 
(daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (noting that debtor and spouse may file joint petition); see 
also infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional intent 
behind § 302). 
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (explaining that debtors can exempt any interest the 
debtor has in property owned by a tenant by the entirety); id. § 522(d) (noting that 
debtor can exempt the debtor's interest in property a dependent uses as a residence); 
id. § 524(a)(3); In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 359-60 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989) (discussing 
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3)); In re Strickland, 153 B.R. 909, 912-13 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) 
(same); In re Smith, 140 B.R. 904 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992) (same); see also infra notes 
135-48 and accompanying text (describing the protection from creditors afforded a 
debtor spouse's property that is held in tenancy by the entirety); infra notes 157-59, 
162 and accompanying text (commenting on a debtor spouse's ability to claim a non-
debtor spouse as a dependent under § 522( d)). 
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (noting that Chapter 13 debtors may exclude from 
their "disposable" income any expenses reasonably necessary to be expended for the 
maintenance or support of a dependent of the debtor); see also infra notes 161-63 and 
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and the ability to protect a non-debtor spouse from certain creditor 
collection activities.10 Due in part to the dramatic increase in bank-
ruptcy filings by individuals,11 Congress is currently reevaluating the 
type of relief individuals should receive when they file a bankruptcy 
petition.12 As part of this reform process, Congress should ask 
whether-not\vithstanding the policy expressed in the Defense of 
Marriage Act-certain debtors should be entitled to extra benefits 
based simply on their choice or ability to marry. 
This Article considers the role of marital status in federal bank-
ruptcy laws and argues that Congress should ignore marital status 
when awarding benefits to debtors in bankruptcy cases. Part I of this 
Article discusses the historical justifications given for protecting and 
promoting the institution of marriage. This part traces the dramatic 
changes both in the nature and permanency13 of modern intimate rela-
accompanying text (explaining that a debtor may enjoy the protections of this section 
without proving the non-debtor spouse's financial dependence}. 
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (stating that if the bankruptcy estate included community 
property and the bankruptcy case discharged community claims, discharge is effective 
against community creditors of the non-debtor and debtor spouse); see also it/. 
§§ 1201, 1301 (noting that creditors stayed from collecting co-signed debts during pen-
dency of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases); infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text 
(noting that the benefits of sections 1201 and 1301 extend to all non-debtor 
cohabitants). 
11. In 1997, 1.3 million individuals filed bankruptcy petitions. See U.S. Bankntptcy 
Filings 1980-1997 (Business, Non-Business, Total) (visited Aug. 11, 1998} <http:// 
www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html> (showing increase in filings since 1980). 
This is an increase of almost 200% since 1990. See id. 
12. Largely in response to recommendations made in the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission's October 1997 Report, National Bankruptcy Review Comm'n, 
Bankruptcy: The Next 20 Years (1997), a number of bills designed to reform per-
ceived abuses in the bankruptcy system were introduced in Congress during the 1997-
98 session. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150. 105th Cong. (1998) 
(precluding individuals from filing for complete relief in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 
liquidation if they are deemed to have the means to pay creditors): Consumer Lend-
ers and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998. H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (amending federal bankruptcy law to ex-pand the list of creditors' claims); Reli-
gious Fairness in Bankruptcy Act of 1997, H.R. 2611, 105th Cong. (1997} (modifying 
federal bankruptcy law with respect to religious donations); Religious Liberty and 
Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1997, H.R 2604, 105th Cong. (1997) (ex-
panding debtors' right to make charitable contributions); Private Trustee Reform Act 
of 1997, H.R. 2592, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending courts' authority to determine the 
necessary expenses of trustees); Responsible Borrower Act of 1997, H.R. 2500. 105th 
Cong. (1997) (prescribing guidelines for a needs based bankruptcy system}; Credit 
Card Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R 1975, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending the 
Truth in Lending Act); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th 
Cong. (1997) (amending the requirements for converting a Chapter 7 case to a Chap-
ter 12 or Chapter 13 case); Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act 
of 1998, S. 1244, 105th Cong. (1997) (ex-panding debtors' right to make charitable 
contributions). 
13. It is reported that half of all marriages will end in divorce. See Leah Guggen-
heimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreemellts, 17 
Women's Rts. L. Rep.147,149 (1996) ("The current divorce rate is almost one in two, 
as compared to greater than one in three in 1945. In urban areas, the divorce rate 
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tionships between spouses and notes that the State no longer dictates 
the manner in which married couples govern their economic inter-
spousal affairs. Part II examines the hostility courts and legislators 
have traditionally exhibited when asked to give legal recognition or 
benefits to unmarried couples. This part shows that, largely in re-
sponse to the dramatic increase in the number of both heterosexual 
and homosexual couples who cohabit but are not legally married, 14 
modern courts and legislators are generally willing to extend at least 
some limited legal protections to unmarried cohabitants. 
Part III examines non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy laws' treatment 
of married and unmarried couples. This part argues that the current 
interpretation and application of these laws disparately treats married 
and unmarried couples. Because the historical justifications for the 
disparate treatment of married and unmarried couples no longer exist, 
part IV concludes by proposing that Congress give bankruptcy bene-
fits to any married or unmarried "economic unit" that jointly pools 
resources, jointly incurs debts, and jointly agrees to have one member 
of the unit give economical support to the other member. 15 
exceeds 50 percent, and in most large cities and their surrounding suburbs there are 
more divorces each year than marriages."); Amy L. Wax, Against Nature-On Robert 
Wright's the Moral Animal, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 347 n.66 (1996) (citing Council on 
Families in America, Marriage in America: A Report to the Nation (Institute for 
American Values 1995)). 
14. According to United States Census reports, the number of unmarried couple 
households numbered 439,000 in 1960, 523,000 in 1970, 1,589,000 in 1980,2,856,000 in 
1990, 3,668,000 in 1995, and 4,130,000 in 1997. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statisti-
cal Abstract of the United States 56 (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract]; 
Census Bureau, Marital Stat!IS and Living Arrangements (last modified March, 1997) 
<http://www.census.dove/prod/3/98pubs/p20-5060updf>. Moreover, the percentage of 
adults who are married was 65.6% in 1980, but is now reported to be 60.3%. See 
Statistical Abstract, supra, at 54. 
15. This Article does not consider whether marital status is relevant when granting 
federal benefits other than bankruptcy benefits, nor does it address whether states 
should permit same sex marriages. These issues have been exhaustively treated else-
where. See, e.g., James W. Button et al., Private Lives, Public Conflicts (1997) (analyz-
ing the adoption and implementation of gay rights legislation); Richard D. Mohr, A 
More Perfect Union (1994); Same Sex Marriage (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosen-
baum eds., 1997) (offering individual perspectives on legalizing same-sex marriage); 
Vada Berger, Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 417 (1991) (analyz-
ing the benefits and drawbacks of domestic partnership initiatives); Amy R. Brown-
stein, Why Same-Sex SpoliSes Should Be Granted Preferential Immigration Status: 
Reevaluating Adams v. Howerton, 16 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 763 (1994) (exam-
ining current treatment by United States courts of same-sex marriage for immigration 
purposes); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev. 
1419 (1993) (discussing the history of same-sex marriage and its implications); An-
drew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scrip-
tural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 How. L.J. 173 
(1992) (examining the religious foundation of legal prohibitions against same-sex 
marriage); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A 
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 
1164 (1992) (analyzing and proposing improvements in domestic relations law); Rob-
ert L. Cordell II, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and 
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I. PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE INSTITUTION 
OF MARRIAGE16 
Historically, marriage was a public matter, not a private concern of 
two individuals. At common law, the act of marriage merged two be-
ings into oneP Marriage, as a legal "status," was defined and regu-
lated by the State.18 As participants in this status-based relationship, 
spouses were defined by their roles as wives or husbands and were 
bound by legal restrictions that largely disregarded their personal 
preferences or desires.19 For example, because the State dictated all 
terms of the marital relationship, neither party could terminate the 
relationship (i.e., divorce) unless there was proof that one of them had 
engaged in behavior inconsistent with the duties of marriage.:w Thus, 
when marriage was a merger, spouses were required to show "fault" 
before the State would terminate the marriage.21 Indeed, in almost all 
an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Cretiit Clause, 26 Col urn. 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 247 (1994) (canvassing states' traditional conflict of laws rules re-
garding marriage laws and marriage recognition); Steven K. Homer, Note, Against 
Marriage, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505 (1994) (comparing traditional marriage and 
same-sex relationships in the context of legal discrimination); Jeffrey J. Swart, Com-
ment, The Wedding Luau-Who is Invited?: Hawaii, Same-Sex Marriage, anti Emerg-
ing Realities, 43 Emory LJ. 1577 (1994) (analyzing greater governmental tolerance of 
same-sex units); Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, anti the Same-Sex Couple, 
12 Cardozo L. Rev. 681 (1990) (arguing that legalization of same-sex marriage is con-
sistent with the American family). 
16. I address the nature of past and current spousal economic relationships (and 
argue that Congress should adopt a marriage model that imposes financial burdens on 
spouses if marital status is recognized in bankruptcy cases) in a related article. See A. 
Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor, and (oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forcetito 
Pay Each Other's Debts (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
17. See 1 Williant Blackstone, Commentaries 430 ("By marriage, the husband and 
wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that 
of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything 
.... "). 
18. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Supreme Court described mar-
riage as a "contract" that cannot be changed by the contracting parties because the 
State holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. lti. at 211. The Court then 
referred to marriage as "an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the 
public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, with-
out which there would be neither civilization nor progress." /d. 
19. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 11-12 (1993) 
[hereinafter Regan, Family Law]; Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 4 
(1985) [hereinafter Weitzman, Revolution]. 
20. For example, neither party could be married to two people at the same time, 
or enter into a contract that was inconsistent with their marital vows, a requirement 
that continues today. See John De Witt Gregory et al., Understanding Family Law 
§ 4.03, at 84-85 (1993); see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status 
Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-/930, 82 Geo. W. 2127, 2182-83 
(1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Modernization) (noting that the basic terms of a marriage 
were fixed by law and could not be altered by the parties). 
21. 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 
§ 2.1, at 75 (2d ed. 1987). 
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matters, the private and public interests22 of the individual spouses 
were subordinated to the State's interest in preserving the marital 
unit.23 
When marriage was a status, men and women had clearly defined 
roles as husbands and wives. Once "merged," the wife became her 
husband's property24 and all her personal rights were controlled by 
the merged unit (i.e., her husband).Z5 A husband was given the sole 
right to control all marital assets, including property his wife owned 
before marriage or property held as tenants by the entirety.26 While 
entirety property could not be immediately seized by a spouse's sepa-
rate creditors and sold to satisfy a separate debt, in some cases credi-
tors were allowed to reach a spouse's survivorship interest in entirety 
property.27 Thus, all marital assets potentially could be used to pay 
either the couple's debts or the husband's separate debts. 
22. Many family law feminist scholars argue that it is not possible to separate pub-
lic, market interests from private, family ones. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other 1\ventieth Century Tragedies 186-88 
(1995) (noting that a family's right to "privacy" was often used to cloak violence 
against women and children even when the wife sought protection from the State); 
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 
2227, 2281 (1994) (arguing that "the boundaries between the market and the family 
are porous"). But cf. Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 158-59 (advocating the 
consideration of a new model of "status" in family law, but conceding that women in 
general, and wives specifically, may be devalued if the law is designed to make 
changes in the "public" world of work, but not in the "private" world of the family). 
23. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210-11; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2132; 
see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality 19 (1991) (comparing 
historical and modern views of marriage); Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at lO 
(noting that nineteenth century judges and scholars explicitly recognized marriage as 
a status rather than merely as a contract); Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: 
The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 Va. L. Rev. 663, 669-70 (1976) [hereinafter Glen-
don, Marriage and the State] (discussing Jaws that have restricted marriage by impos-
ing age and consent restrictions and waiting period requirements). 
24. See Weitzman, Revolution, supra note 19, at 3 ("Upon marriage the wife be-
came a femme covert [sic], a legal nonperson, living under her husband's arm, protec-
tion, and cover.") (citation omitted); Blanche Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L. 
Rev. 28, 29 (1935) ("The financial plan of marriage law was founded upon the eco-
nomic relationship of owner and property."). 
25. For example, a wife assumed her husband's surname and could not engage in 
legal actions unless they were brought in her husband's name. See Lenore J. Weitz-
man, The Marriage Contract 5, 9-12 (1981) [hereinafter Weitzman, Contract] (discuss-
ing wives' loss of independent identity); Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 
23, at 702 (observing that many "believe that a woman's name changes upon marriage 
as a matter of law"). 
26. See John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the 
Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1033, 
1045 (1972). Before the nineteenth century, the doctrine of coverture deprived wives 
of the right to control their property and gave that right to their husbands. See Joan C. 
Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 383, 385 (1994) 
("Married women 'covered' by their husbands lost control over property brought into 
the marriage .... "). 
27. Although some individual creditors could levy upon the entirety property to 
reach both the debtor spouse's present and survivorship interest in the property, the 
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Because husbands had the right to exercise absolute control over 
their wives' person and property, the common law imposed a duty on 
them to financially support their wives.28 Husbands were generally 
given wide latitude in deciding the parameters of this duty, however, 
as states routinely refused to set a minimum level of required financial 
support.29 If, however, a wife purchased basic goods or services from 
a third-party creditor, the law made the husband liable (under the 
doctrine of necessaries) to pay the creditor for those goods or serv-
ices.30 While creditors could generally force husbands to pay for their 
wives' basic living expenses, courts would not force husbands to pay 
for unnecessary items31 or items within the wife's means to repay.32 
creditor's interest was always subject to the non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship. 
See Caryl A. Yzenbaard, Ohio's Beleaguered Emirery Sramre, 49 U. Cin. L Rev. 99, 
102 (1980). Because the creditor would be a co-tenant with the non-debtor spouse, it 
could not partition the property to sell it immediately to satisfy the debt. See id. at 
102-03. With the right only to reach the debtor spouse's survivorship interest, a credi-
tor could satisfy the debt only if the debtor spouse survived the non-debtor spouse. 
See id. at 102. 
28. See Crozier, supra note 24, at 28 ("(The duty) is so familiar that we generally 
overlook its peculiar nature. Upon even the briefest analysis it is clear that this is a 
rule quite different from any which would be applied in other departments of life 
0. 0 ."). 
29. See id. at 33. Crozier noted that: 
[The] right of support is not a right to any definite thing or any definite 
amount even in proportion to the husband's means .... (T]he chances-
which have nothing to do with legal rights-may be either that she ,,;u with 
difficulty get an inadequate subsistence or that she will live in idleness and 
luxury. This is precisely the situation in which property finds itself; it may be 
overworked and underfed, or it may be petted and fed with cream, and that 
is a matter for the owner to decide. 
Id.; see also Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and 
Family in the United States and Western Europe 115 (1989) [hereinafter Glendon, 
'fransformation] (noting judicial noninterference in disputes involving spouses' finan-
cial support obligations); Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 40-42 (citing cases 
dealing with the nature and sufficiency of a husband's support during marriage). 
30. See Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. 1984). Many state 
courts subsequently abolished the doctrine, finding that it constituted unconstitutional 
gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578, 580 (Ala. 
1992) (holding that the doctrine of necessaries is unconstitutional}; Condore v. Prince 
George's County, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981} (holding that neither husband nor 
wife is liable without a contract for the necessaries supplied to the other): North Ot-
towa Community Hosp. v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. 1998) (finding that the com-
mon law doctrine of necessaries is unconstitutional); Govan v. Medical Credit Sen'S., 
Inc., 621 So. 2d 928, 931 (Miss. 1993} (holding one spouse not liable for debts for 
another without express consent); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp.,lnc., 303 
S.E.2d 905, 908 (Va. 1983) (holding that the necessaries doctrine creates a gender-
based classification not substantially related to serving important government inter-
ests and is therefore unconstitutional). 
31. The scope of what was "necessary" was dependent on the husband's financial 
status. See Karol Williams, Comment, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Comemporary 
Application As A Support Remedy, 19 Stetson L Rev. 661, 664 (1990). 
32. Creditors had the burden of proving that the item was necessary, that the hus-
band had not already provided the item, and that the wife lacked independent means 
of paying for it. See Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So. 2d 199, 204 
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Just as husbands had roles to play, wives historically had gender-
specific roles. Throughout much of this century, with the possible ex-
ception of war periods,33 wives were expected34 to stay home35 and be 
housewives and mothers.36 In part because of this forced role as 
caregiver in the home, wives were deemed to be intellectually incapa-
ble of managing any matter outside the home.37 A wife could not own 
property separately,38 enter into contracts,39 execute any legal docu-
ment,40 sue or be sued,41 or have a domicile separate from her hus-
(Fla. 1988); Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Wis. 1980). 
While creditors theoretically had an incentive to give a married woman necessary 
goods and services, in practice few creditors did so because of the uncertainty that 
courts actually would force husbands to reimburse them. See Note, The Unnecessary 
Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1767, 1774 (1984). 
33. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1223 n.152 (1989) (citing Alice Kessler-Harris, 
Women Have Always Worked: A Historical Overview 141-43 (1981)); Phyllis T. 
Bookspan, A Delicate Imbalance-Family and Work, 5 Tex. J. Women & L. 37, 45 n.45 
(1995) (observing that women's participation in the workforce after Pearl Harbor rose 
460% ); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of 
Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1160-66 (1991). 
34. It is doubtful that black wives were "expected" to remain home and be taken 
care of financially by their husbands. African-American wives and mothers have con-
sistently worked outside the home in numbers that vastly outnumber those of white 
women. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 201 (stating that "the stay-at-home 
housewife so taken for granted in the legal model is an ideal that poor black families 
cannot afford"); 1\vila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the 
Search for Theory, 82 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2486-90 (1994). Recent statistical studies sug-
gest that most black mothers are not currently married, and it is unclear whether they 
cohabit with the fathers of their children. See Jane Mauldon, Family Change and Wel-
fare Reform, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 325, 331-33 (1996). 
35. In pre-industrial agrarian marriages, wives worked on the family farm super-
vised by their husbands. See generally Glendon, Transformation, supra note 29, at 111 
(noting that in a large group of marriages, specifically those where women had no 
independent means and did not work outside the home, turn-of-the-century economic 
reforms were irrelevant); Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 169 (stating that 
"most women were engaged in domestic employment or agricultural work"); Glen-
don, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 707-08 (noting that a woman's role 
included care of a household and children as well as duties in the agricultural produc-
tion unit). 
36. See Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 28 (discussing the Victorian role 
expectations of spouses); Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 60-64 (discussing the 
wife's traditional domestic responsibilities). 
37. See Johnston, supra note 26, at 1084. Although wives were expected to care 
for the children in the home, fathers had the right to ownership and control over the 
children and, as a result, until the early part of the twentieth-century mothers rou-
tinely were denied custody of their children at divorce. See Linda D. Elrod, Child 
Custody Practice & Procedure § 1:05 (1996); Fineman, supra note 22, at 76. 
38. See Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2127; Williams, supra note 26, at 
385. 
39. See Blackstone, supra note 17, at 145; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 
2127. 
40. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Con-
cerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994) [herein-
after Siegel, Home as Work]; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2127; Williams, 
supra note 26, at 386-87. 
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band.42 Indeed, even if she were forced to leave the home to earn 
wages to help support her family, the law gave her husband the right 
to control (or sue to collect) those wages.43 States ultimately passed 
laws designed to give married women the right to keep their pre-mari-
tal property and their individual wages.44 At common law, however, 
wives were essentially prevented from participating in any financial 
activity in or outside the home and were deemed incompetent to par-
ticipate in most activities outside the domestic sphere.45 
Finally, because wives were viewed as little more than their hus-
bands' chattel, they had no bodily integrity.46 Specifically, the law as-
41. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 40, at 1082; see also Hendrik Hartog, 
Marital Exits and Marital ExpectatiollS in Ninereemil Cenwry America, 80 Geo. W. 
95, 101 (1991) (stating that, even in equity, a wife could not sue under her own name). 
42. See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562,571-72 (1906) (discussing a wife's 
duty to remain at the matrimonial domicile); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 
(5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that a wife's domicile is deemed to be that of her hus-
band, but refusing to expand that concept when the wife is married to a citizen of a 
foreign country); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Parellls, Parmers, and Personal Juris-
diction, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 813, 844 {discussing domicile in divorce litigation). 
43. While many states adopted "earnings statutes" in the 1860's that were 
designed to give wives the right to their wages, wives in Georgia were not entitled to 
own their wages until1943. See Johnston, supra note 26, at 1070; see also Siegel, Home 
as Work, supra note 40, at 1076-90, 1117 (discussing a wife's lack of property rights to 
her wages); \Vllliams, supra note 26, at 386-87,389 (discussing how a \\ife's wages and 
services belonged to her husband). 
44. See 7 Richard R. Powell et al., Powell on Real Property '1622(3) (1998); John-
ston, supra note 26, at 1061-70; see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 311 (1989) (stating 
how a wife may keep her own earnings as a result of the Married Women's Act of 
1869); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 65n (West 1993) (stating that a wife may own real 
and personal property in her own right); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-7-2 (Michie 1997) 
{stating that married women have the same property rights as unmarried women); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 460:1 (1992) (stating that property acquired at any time by a 
woman shall be free from interference or control by her husband); N.Y. Dom. Rei. 
Law§ 50 (McKinney 1998) (stating that real or personal property owned by a married 
woman shall be sole and separate property); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-1 (1991) (stating 
that real and personal property of any married person acquired before or during mar-
riage shall remain the sole and separate property of such married persons); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 20-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that a married woman has the power to 
convey her separate property to the same extent as if she were unmarried); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 36-3-504 (1996) (stating that marriage shall not impose any disability on 
a woman as to ownership or disposition of any property); Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 
(1995) (stating that a wife has the same rights to property as an unmarried woman); 
Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850,71 Geo. W. 1359, 
1410 (1983). But see Crozier, supra note 24, at 35-41 (noting that early interpretations 
of the Married Women's Property Act still deemed a wife's wages to be owned by her 
husband). Allowing wives to hold separate properties primarily benefited the rich, 
who were able to bequeath property to their daughters without having the property 
automatically transferred to their sons-in-law. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 
40, at 1202; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2135. 
45. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley. J., concurring) (argu-
ing that women are "unfit" for many occupations in the market because the "domestic 
sphere" was the "domain and function[ ) of womanhood"). 
46. At common law, husbands could moderately "chastise" their wives by using a 
stick no bigger than their thumbs. See Blackstone, supra note 17, at 432-33. 
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sumed that sex-on-demand was an irrevocable term in the marriage 
contract and thus, a husband could not "rape" his wife.47 Indeed, at 
common law, only rarely could the State successfully convict a hus-
band who helped another man rape his wife or who forced his wife to 
have sex with another man.48 Moreover, if a wife were assaulted by 
her husband (or at the direction of her husband), she could not pursue 
a civil action against him for assault because her husband controlled 
her right to file all legal actions and, consequently, he would be both 
the plaintiff and the defendant in the assault litigation.49 Similarly, 
even if she sued her husband, she would not be entitled to keep any 
monetary damages, because her husband owned her property.50 
Things (happily) have changed since the common law. Modern 
courts and legislators have overwhelmingly rejected the view that 
spouses' preferences and desires about the marital relationship are ir-
relevant and that marriage is a status with state-imposed terms51 
designed to promote the stability and welfare of society. 52 For exam-
ple, men no longer have the legal right to exercise complete and unfet-
47. See 1 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 628-29 (1847); Lisa 
R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Recon-
ceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 677, 680 (1996); Jaye Sitton, Comment, 
Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 261, 265 
(1993). 
48. See Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. Fam. L. 
559, 562-63 (1990-91). For a general discussion of marital rape statutory exemptions, 
including attempts to extend the exemption to non-married cohabiting males, sec Es-
kow, supra note 47, at 681-83. 
49. See William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation, 43 
Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1033 (1930). 
50. Jack L. Herskowitz, Comment, Tort Liability Between Husband And Wife: 
The Interspousal Immunity Doctrine, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 423,427 n.29 (1966) (citing 
Austin v. Austin, 100 So. 591, 592 (Miss. 1924)). Likewise, even when wives had the 
right to prosecute their husbands for assault, courts generally would not interfere in 
family disputes unless the wife was severely injured because each family (i.e., the hus-
band) had the right to determine the domestic governance in its household. See gener-
ally Carl E. Schneider, Moral Disclosure and the Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1836 (1985) (discussing nineteenth century judicial views 
concerning noninterference in the family). Not surprisingly, the traditional plighting 
of troth in marriage ceremonies required women to pledge to "love, honor and obey" 
their husbands, while men were required to "love, honor and keep" their wives. See 
To Love, Honor-And Obey?, Time, July 21, 1986, at 45 (emphasis added). 
51. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and 
Property Rhetoric, 82 Geo. L.J. 2303, 2313 (1994) [hereinafter Regan, Spouses and 
Strangers]; Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits 
of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2423, 2424-25 (1994). See gen-
erally Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for 
State Policy, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 207 (1982) (arguing that spouses should have access, 
during marriage, to legal dispute resolution of privately contracted marital 
obligations). 
52. See Glendon, Transformation, supra note 29, at 291-93 (discussing the transfor-
mation of marital status views); Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 89-117 (describ-
ing evolution from status to contract as legal basis of family relationships); see also 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 Utah L. 
Rev. 687 (positing that "relationships are voluntary and contractual"). 
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tered domination and control over all aspects of their wives's lives53 
and wives are no longer deemed legal non-entities. Although states 
currently give spouses greater leeway in deciding how to govern and 
terminate their marriages, states still exercise complete control over 
how marriages are created54 and continue to view marriage as a mat-
ter of "public concern. "55 Like\vise, although states no longer assume 
that wives are incapable of handling any financial aspects of their 
lives, and thus, need to be controlled by their husbands, states con-
tinue to believe that married couples assume at least some minimal 
commitment of mutual support upon marriage.56 
While acknowledging that society continues to favor the institution 
of marriage, some family law scholars have observed that modern 
marriages should be viewed more accurately as partnerships of auton-
omous persons formed to promote the happiness of the two individu-
als and that the operation of the partnership should be largely free 
from external regulations.57 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
53. Although modem assault and battery statutes make prosecutions theoretically 
possible, law enforcement and social services agencies may not treat intra-family as-
saults as seriously as stranger assaults. See John Marzulli. Home Violence Swells: Rise 
in Homicide, Rape & Assault-NYPD, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 30, 1997, at 10 (noting 
criticism that police did not take domestic violence seriously}: see also Rhonda L 
Kohler, Comment, The Battered Women and Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting 
Domestic Vwlence, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1025, 1029-30 (1992) (noting criticism of 
"traditional tort law for not taking into account the experiences of women in battering 
relationships"). 
The Southern Baptist Convention recently added an article to the Baptist Faith and 
Message that both defines marriage in heterosexual terms and requires a \\ife ~to 
submit graciously to the servant leadership of her husband." Mary Rourke, A Wo-
man's Place: What the Denominations Think, L.A. Times, June 16, 1998, at E2. Thus, 
at least some members of society continue to prefer the common law view of female 
subservience. 
54. See Baehr v. Le\vin, 852 P.2d 44,58 (Haw. 1993) (discussing the state's control 
over who can legally marry): see also supra note 1 (citing examples of statutes that 
define and regulate marriage). 
55. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18 (Ct. App. 1993): see also Chandler 
v. Central Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 653 (Kan. 1993) (noting that annulments arc disfa-
vored because "the marriage relationship is a matter of public concern"): Simeone v. 
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 168 (Pa. 1990) (McDermott. J .• dissenting) (disagreeing \\ith 
the majority's characterization of marriage in contractual terms and rejecting the view 
that marriage is a "mere contract for hire"). 
56. See Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (quoting Sec v. Sec, 415 P.2d 776, 780 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1966)); see also Cal. Fam. Code § 4300 (West 1994) (requiring spouses to 
support each other); id. § 720 (requiring that husbands and \vi\'es pledge to one an-
other mutual respect, fidelity, and support); id. §§ 1620, 3580 (prohibiting husbands 
and wives generally from altering their legal relationship toward each other); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 123.090 (Michie 1993) (entitling creditors to separate property of non-
debtor spouse to satisfy necessaries of debtor spouse); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.02 
(West 1993) (obligating each spouse to support the other). 
57. See Schultz, supra note 51, at 251. See generally Fineman. supra note 23, at 1&-
19 (noting that earlier views of marriage protected the private unity of a husband and 
wife from state intrusion or regulation, but suggesting that marriage currently exists as 
an institution primarily to promote the happiness of a couple). 
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Act58 somewhat synthesizes this status-less view of marriage by defin-
ing marriage as a "personal relationship between a man and a woman 
[that arises from] a civil contract to which the consent of the parties is 
essential. "59 Certain political, economic, and legal developments cre-
ated the impetus for viewing marriage less as a merger and more as a 
partnership. These developments include: the development of an in-
dustrial (rather than agrarian) workforce;60 the increase in the number 
of women wage-earners;61 society's increased demand to protect and 
promote individual liberty;62 a reduction in gender bias in marriage 
laws;63 society's changing moral beliefs;64 and the changing economic 
relationships between spouses. 65 
The biggest push to view marriage as a partnership occurred after 
scholars and lawyers representing "homemaker" wives saw these stay-
58. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is recognized in the following states: 
Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washing-
ton. See Marti E. Thurman, Note, Maintenance: A Recognition of the Need for Guide-
lines, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 971, 974 n.21 (1994-95). 
59. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act§ 201 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 175 (1998). 
60. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 40, at 1092. As husbands increasingly 
left the family farm to work in an industrial workplace, wives became even more 
dependent on their husbands for cash. To combat the prevailing view that husbands 
left the home to "work" while wives stayed at home and did nothing socially produc-
tive, antebellum women's rights advocates argued that household labor should also be 
viewed as "work." See id. at 1092-94. 
61. Compare Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 3 (predicting that as more 
married women enter full-time work, for more pay and at higher occupational levels, 
their roles, power, and authority within family will continue to change), with Borelli, 
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poche, J., dissenting) (commenting that "[t]he assumption that 
only the rare wife can make a financial contribution to her family has become badly 
outdated in this age in which many married women have paying employment outside 
the home [and a] two-income family can no longer be dismissed as a statistically insig-
nificant aberration"). 
62. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) 
(holding a zoning ordinance unconstitutional because of its arbitrary definition of 
"family"); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973) (finding a due process violation 
when state law irrebuttably presumes that an in-state student with a non-resident 
spouse is a non-resident); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,454-55 (1972) (stating that 
dissimilar treatment of married and unmarried people in the distribution of contra-
ceptives violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962) (holding that due process is violated when a 
state statute criminalizes status of narcotic addiction without proof that the accused 
used narcotics in the jurisdiction). 
63. See Crozier, supra note 24, at 28 (comparing the economic relationship be-
tween spouses in traditional marriages to that "between master and slave ... between 
a person and his domesticated animal"). Once slavery was abolished, it increasingly 
became difficult to treat wives as their husbands' property. See Siegel, Modernization, 
supra note 20, at 2201. But cf John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in Essays 
on Sex Equality 123, 217 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970) (observing that "marriage is the 
only actual bondage known to our law" and "there remain no legal slaves, except the 
mistress of every house"). 
64. See Schneider, supra note 50, at 1842-45 (discussing the waning influence of 
Christianity in some groups). 
65. See Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 698 (discussing factors 
that led to the diminution of the legal effects of formal marriage). 
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at-home spouses harmed economically by no-fault divorce laws. To 
counter the treatment homemaker spouses increasingly received at di-
vorce, wives' advocates argued that spouses should be viewed as eco-
nomic partners because work both in the home and in the market 
benefits the joint financial endeavor (i.e., the marriage )_l>6 These ad-
vocates argued that if the parties agreed (either implicitly or explic-
itly) that the wife would stay home to rear children and care for the 
family, then the stay-at-home spouse would be entitled to equal finan-
cial treatment at divorce because her household labor is as an asset 
that contributed to the financial success of the marriage.67 By charac-
terizing marriage as a "partnership," \vives encouraged courts to ana-
lyze the marital relationship using contract terminology. 
Because common law marriages were regulated by both the State 
and the Church, courts historically refused to view marriage as a mere 
contract.68 In addition, because the \vife's existence merged into her 
husband's at common law, spouses historically could not enter into 
contracts with each other: such a contract would be deemed to be 
between the husband (as a legally competent contracting party) and 
the husband (as the legal representative of his legally incompetent 
wife).69 Moreover, because the state dictated all terms of the marital 
relationship, courts routinely found that inter-spousal contracts either 
were void for lack of consideration (because the \vife was legally obli-
gated to perform domestic services) or were unenforceable on public 
policy grounds (because the husband had a duty to support his \vife).70 
66. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 66-67; Regan, Spouses and Stran-
gers, supra note 51, at 2316. 
67. See Regan, supra note 51, at 2316; see also Barry A. Schatz & Jacalyn Birn-
baum, New Statute Promotes Homemakers' Rights, 80 Ill. BJ. 610, 616 (1992) (report-
ing that Illinois recognizes the value of a homemaker's contribution to marital estate 
and noting that the contribution may require a lengthy absence from the work force); 
Mark A. Sessums, What Are Wives' Comributions Worth Upon Di~·orce?: Toward 
Fully Incorporating Partnership Into Equitable Distribwion, 41 Fla. L Rev. 987 (1989) 
(arguing for a rebuttable presumption of "equal" distribution of property at divorce 
to avoid discounting wives' contributions outside the market, especially when the par-
ties have agreed to such an arrangement); John R. Dowd, Note, Defining the Doctrine 
of Equitable Distribution in Mississippi: A Rebuttable Presumption That Homemak-
ing Services Are as Valuable to the Acquisition of Marital Property as Breadwinning 
Services, 16 Miss. C. L Rev. 479, 486-87 (1996) (noting state court's recognition that 
homemaker services significantly contribute to a marital estate and that rendering 
those services may have caused a homemaker to sacrifice his!her own career). 
68. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on 
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 67, 116 (1993). 
69. See Blackstone, supra note 17, at 430; see also Hartog, supra note 41, at 101 
(noting a spouse's inability to enter into a separation agreement). 
70. See Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697, 698 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968) ("[A] 
contract between husband and wife whereby one spouse agrees to perform specified 
obligations imposed by law as a part of the marital duties of the spouses to each other 
is without consideration, and is void as against public policy."); see also Weitzman, 
supra note 25, at 338 (noting historical restrictions on contracts between husbands and 
wives). 
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Even after wives were given the legal right to enter into contracts in 
their own names, judges were reluctant to enforce any market-based 
contract that released a husband from providing economic support to 
his wife or that obligated the husband to pay his wife for performing 
domestic services71 because of the courts' concern that recognizing 
such contracts would encourage married couples to act strategically 
(rather than altruistically) in their marriages to protect themselves fi-
nancially in the event of divorce. Similarly, courts felt that encourag-
ing spouses to contractually define their duties to each other during 
the marriage would promote an alienated, cynical view of marriage 
that desecrates the institution and debases its intimate nature.72 In 
addition to questioning the incentives created by such contracts, 
courts felt institutionally incompetent to handle a contract that regu-
lated marital minutiae such as who takes out the trash, who changes 
the baby's diapers, and how often couples have sex.73 Finally, judges 
were concerned that recognizing inter-spousal contracts would result 
in married couples flooding the courts with requests for judicial inter-
vention in private marital affairs?4 
71. While modem courts will enforce most premarital agreements, most will still 
not enforce inter-spousal contracts that obligate the husband to pay the wife for per-
forming acts traditionally performed by wives, including performing domestic house-
hold labor. See Finch v. Finch, 592 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that 
a wife cannot be compensated for leaving her job to care for her sick husband upon 
divorce); Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416-17 (N.C. 1945) (finding a contract be-
tween husband and wife for services rendered by wife to her late husband unenforce-
able because it related to domestic obligations incident to marriage); Oates v. Oates, 
33 S.E.2d 457, 460 (W.Va. 1945) (holding that a wife's agreement to perform domes-
tic duties for compensation was contrary to public policy and lacked consideration); 
cf Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that "a spouse 
is not entitled to compensation for support apart from rights to community property 
and the like that arises from the marital relation itself'); see also Schultz, supra note 
51 (noting cases dealing with the marital contract or relation). See generally Siegel, 
Modernization, supra note 20, at 2182, 2204 ("Without exception, courts ruled inter-
spousal contracts regarding wives' domestic labor unenforceable."). 
72. See generally Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (Md. 1985) (holding that a 
medical degree and license were not encompassed within the legislatively intended 
definition of marital property); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982) (hold-
ing that where a spouse receives from his or her partner financial contributions used 
in obtaining a professional degree with expectation of deriving material benefits for 
both marriage partners, such spouse may have to reimburse the supporting spouse); 
Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (noting the majority 
view that "a wife who contributes to her husband's professional education may not, 
upon divorce, receive an award for her contributions"); Starnes, supra note 68, at 116 
n.221 (citing a Supreme Court case holding that marriage is more than a mere con-
tract). But see Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21-22 (Poche, J., dissenting) (rejecting the 
view that enforcing an interspousal contract would degrade the spouse providing the 
service and reduce that spouse to no better than a hired servant). 
73. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 709 ("Con-
tracts which purport to regulate who washes the dishes and takes out the garbage are 
no more enforceable than the famous 'invitation to dinner."'). 
74. Starnes, supra note 68, at 116. 
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Despite courts' initial unwillingness to enforce any marital contract, 
and their continued reluctance to recognize contracts that govern the 
operation of an existing marriage, couples have increasingly turned to 
the law to give certainty to their legal and economic obligations to 
each other in the event of divorce. As a result, more couples are rely-
ing on prenuptial agreements and other premarital financial plan-
ning?5 Indeed, given the increased use of these contracts by some 
types of prospective spouses,76 modem marriage in many ways looks 
like an arms-length contractual agreement.77 While courts tradition-
ally resisted attempts to enforce marital contracts, given the increased 
use of premarital agreements and the rise in divorces, courts now rou-
tinely recognize the validity of these agreements.78 
75. Drafting a prenuptial or antenuptial contract requires the assistance of an at-
torney. The estimated cost of a prenuptial agreement ranges from $1,500 to $3,000 in 
routine cases to potentially six figures in complicated cases. See Burton Young & 
Mitchell K. Karpf, In Addition co Safeguarding Inheritances, Prenuptial Comracts Can 
Help Attorneys Protect Their Finn Ownership Imerests, Nat'! U., Dec. 15, 1997, at B7 
(observing that complex agreements conceivably could cost as much as $100,000). 
Given this, only prospective spouses with significant assets to protect and who can 
afford to hire a lawyer to protect those assets will use premarital contracts. See Gary 
Belsky, The Best Money Moves for Every Season of Your Life, Money, Aug. 1997, at 
116, 117. See generally Eric Schmuckler, Breaking Up Is Complex To Do, Forbes, Oct. 
24, 1988, at 360, 360 (discussing the complexities of divorce among the wealthy \\ith-
out a prenuptial agreement). Currently, an estimated five percent of the 2.4 million 
couples who marry each year sign prenuptial agreements. See Belsky, supra, at 117. 
76. Prospective spouses most likely to use (or be told to usc) pre-marital agree-
ments include those who (1) have children from previous relationships. (2) own a 
business, (3) earn significantly more than the other spouse, or (4) have considerable 
assets. See Belsky, supra note 75, at 117; see also David L Chambers, What If! The 
Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male 
Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 479 (1996) (discussing the availability of contractual 
agreements among married couples that provide for a different division of assets upon 
divorce or death than the law would normally allow); Richard A. Epstein, A Last 
Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. Miami L. Rev 253, 271 (1986) ("Today of course 
marriages are much less status and more contractual, and it is not surprising that ante-
nuptial agreements have a far \vider scope to play, especially in second marriages 
when either or both partners have substantial assets and children by previous mar-
riage."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking Abour Marriage and Di~·orce, 16 
Va. L. Rev. 9, 79 n.174 (1990) (discussing two situations in which prenuptial agree-
ments are typically used); Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce aliCI Secular Courts: 
The Promise of Avitzur, 13 Geo. LJ. 193,222 (1984) ("Antenuptial agreements most 
commonly are associated \vith the very wealthy, or with older people who want to 
preserve their estates for children of a previous marriage."). 
77. See Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Comract, 23 U. Mich. J.L Re-
form 217,255 (1990) (observing that marriage has become a less public, more private, 
institution that can better accommodate broad variations in spousal behavior and 
preferences). 
78. See Scott, supra note 52, at 703 (noting courts' willingness to enforce marital 
contracts); Brigid McMenamin, '1il Divorce Do Us Part, Forbes, Oct. 14, 1996, at 52, 
53 (commenting that if done right, prenuptial agreements are "bullet proof'). Section 
306 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that courts should enforce 
written separation agreements unless the agreement is unconscionable. See Unif. 
Marriage and Divorce Act§ 306, 9 U.L.A. 249 (1998). A number of states have either 
adopted U.M.D.A. section 306 or have concluded that written agreements should 
84 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
II. LEGAL TREATMENT OF UNMARRIED COHABITING COUPLES 
States promote marriage primarily to provide a stable environment 
for rearing children and to prevent divorced wives from becoming 
public wards. To encourage marriage and discourage couples from co-
habiting, states historically refused to give unmarried couples any 
legal rights or benefits because of their view that non-marital sexual 
relationships were morally offensive and because of their concern that 
acknowledging these relationships would undermine and debase the 
institution of marriage.79 To discourage these relationships, courts re-
fused to enforce contracts between unmarried couples if the contract 
was designed to regulate marriage-like activities or could be construed 
as being based on illicit sexual activities.80 In addition to concluding 
that unmarried unions were immoral and threatened the economic 
stability provided by marriage, some states also felt that there was no 
compelling justification to protect the rights of unmarried couples be-
cause unmarried cohabiting couples could protect their legal rights by 
marrying each other.81 Finally, courts and states resisted granting 
generally be enforceable unless the agreement is deemed to be unconscionable. See, 
e.g., Idaho Code § 32-925(1)(b) (1997) (stating that separation agreements are not 
enforceable if they are unconscionable); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.180 (Michie 1996) 
("If the court finds the separation agreement unconscionable, it may request the par-
ties to submit a revised separation agreement or may make orders for the disposition 
of property, support, and maintenance."); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-6081(b) (1997) 
(stating that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if it was unconscionable when 
executed); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(a)(2) (1996) (stating that a premarital agreement 
is not enforceable if it was unconscionable when executed); In re Marriage of Manzo, 
659 P.2d 669, 671 (Colo. 1983) (noting that an agreement is subject to review by the 
district court for unconscionability); Simmons v. Simmons, 396 N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ill. 
1979) (stating that an agreement may not be so unjust as to be unconscionable); Voigt 
v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind. 1996) (holding that courts should exercise great 
restraint when determining the enforceability of a settlement agreement); Ferry v. 
Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that a court is bound to 
uphold an agreement unless unconscionable); Weber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781, 783 
(N.D. 1996) ("Property settlement agreements in divorce cases must be scrutinized 
for unconscionability."); Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 1994) (re-
quiring proof of involuntary execution and nondisclosure or waivers in addition to 
unconscionability for an agreement to be set aside by the court). 
79. See Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: 
Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 163, 167 (1985) (stating that some 
courts have maintained that cohabitation agreements involve immoral consideration 
and are therefore unenforceable); Schneider, supra note 50, at 1815. 
80. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 386. In the highly celebrated 
palimony dispute involving the actor Lee Marvin, the court indicated that it would 
enforce an agreement between unmarried cohabitants unless it appeared that the 
agreement rests upon a consideration of sexual services. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 
P.2d 106, 112-13 (Cal. 1976); J. Thomas Oldham & DavidS. Caudhill, A Reconnais-
sance of Public Policy Restrictions Upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabi-
tants, l8 Fam. L.Q. 93, 97 (1984). 
81. See generally Oldham & Caudhill, supra note 80, at 106 ("It was traditionally 
assumed that if a couple wished to establish a serious commitment to one another, 
they would marry or at least hold themselves out as husband and wife."). Of course, 
this applied only to unmarried straight cohabitants. Gay cohabitants could not pro-
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benefits associated with marriage (like inheritance or divorce rights) 
to unmarried cohabitants or those in common law marriages82 because 
of the difficulty of proving whether those cohabitants had legally es-
tablished their entitlement to those marital benefits.83 
Just as courts' views of the legal relationship between married 
couples have changed, courts have been increasingly willing to grant 
legal rights to unmarried couples. Informal marriages84 (including 
those that produce children)85 and other types of non-traditional fam-
ily arrangements are becoming much more common in American soci-
ety.86 Indeed, the United States Census Bureau has recognized this 
societal change and has created separate categories for some of these 
arrangements.87 As these informal marriages become more common, 
teet themselves by marrying since gay marriages have never been, and are not now, 
legally valid anywhere in this country. 
82. Common law marriages are recognized in the following twelve jurisdictions: 
Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A 
Feminist Proposal to Brillg Back Common Law Marriage, 75 Or. L Rev. 709, 715 n.24 
(1996). States that recognize common law marriages generally define them as any 
informal marriage between heterosexuals that does not meet the formal statutory re-
quirements for marriage. See Gregory et. al., supra note 20, at 27. States generally 
will find that a couple is in a common law marriage if the cohabiting couple agrees 
and has the present intent to enter into a matrimonial relationship and holds them-
selves out to the community as husband and wife. See id. at 27-28; Ellen Kandoian, 
Cohabitatio11, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 
Geo LJ. 1829, 1842, 1850 (1987). 
83. See Marone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (N.Y. 1980) (noting that 
while common-law marriage works "substantial justice" in some cases, the doctrine 
was not desirable because there was no built-in method to distinguish valid from inva-
lid claims); see also Kandoian, supra note 82, at 1851-52 (observing that common law 
marriages encourage fraud because a lack of public records makes it difficult to verify 
that the "marriage" actually exists); Prince, supra note 79, at 197 (discussing cohabita-
tion agreements). But see Kathryn S. Vaughn, Comment, The Recelll Changes to the 
Texas lnfonnal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Mar-
riage?, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 1131, 1137 (1991) (arguing that the dangers of fraud are no 
greater in a common law marriage than in any other arrangement that potentially 
offers a large reward). 
84. By "informal" marriages, I mean any intimate relationship that is not officially 
recognized by the State. Included within this term would be common law marriages, 
gay marriages, and any other long-standing relationship between unmarried persons 
who are not legally married. 
85. See Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 124; Kandoian, supra note 82, at 
1865 (discussing an increase in children living in households of cohabiting couples); 
Mauldon, supra note 34, at 330-33 (noting uncertainty as to number of black mothers 
who cohabit with their children's father). 
86. See supra note 14; see also Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rig/us of Unmar-
ried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of" Family, n 29 
J. Fam. L. 497,500 (1990-91) (discussing the rise in "alternative" family arrangements, 
including unmarried gay and straight couples and single parent households). See gen-
erally Oldham & Caudhill, supra note 80, at 112 n.89 (discussing studies that indicate 
that premarital cohabitation may be a "permanent social phenomenon" in the United 
States). 
87. One such category is POSSLQ, Persons of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living 
Quarters. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 14, at 44. One federal court even has 
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they also become more accepted because, even if the arrangement is 
not officially condoned or encouraged, states are increasingly willing 
to grant legal rights to persons in informal marriages or non-tradi-
tional family arrangements.88 
Reasons cited for the increase in non-traditional living arrange-
ments include lower tax benefits for married, low income workers in 
comparison to single workers, higher taxes imposed on high income 
married couples, the desire to avoid having a divorced parent's new 
spouse's income reported on college financial aid applications, and the 
concerns older individuals have of losing federal retirement or health 
benefits upon marriage.89 For many, unmarried cohabitation has be-
come an important form of emotional and financial interdependence, 
comparable to the relationship associated primarily with "traditional" 
marriages.90 Indeed, among certain groups, informal marriage is the 
norm. 
For example, informal marriages among gay and lesbian couples is 
the only "norm" available to them because they are legally prohibited 
cited a humorous poem extolling the joys of "Official POSSLQuity." See Fischer v. 
Dallas Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 465, 469 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1985). 
Other terms used to describe unmarried cohabitants include CUPOS {Cohabiting Un-
married Persons of Opposite Sex) and PSSSLQ (Persons Of The Same Sex Sharing 
Living Quarters). See In re Relationship of Eggers, 638 P.2d 1267, 1270 n.2 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1982) (rejecting POSSLQ in favor of CUPOS); Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning 
Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It Property, 17 Women's Rts. L. 
Rep. 109, 131 n.214 {1996) (referring to PSSSLQs). 
88. For example, courts no longer view the unmarried cohabitation of an ex-
spouse as prima facie grounds for terminating an award of alimony. See Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Me. 1980); Melletz v. Melletz, 638 A.2d 898, 903 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). Likewise, courts no longer terminate parents' custodial 
rights simply because a parent cohabits with a non-spouse. See Nolte v. Nolte, 609 
N.E.2d 381, 385-86 {Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 759 {Mass. App. 
Ct. 1981); Almond v. Almond 257 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). Bllt see 
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108-09 (Va. 1995) (awarding custody to maternal 
grandmother because mother lived with lesbian lover). 
Some courts also have allowed gay persons to adopt children. See In re M.M.D., 662 
A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 {Ill. Ct. App. 1995); In re Tammy, 
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 
1993). Others have permitted gay individuals to adopt each other. See In re Swanson, 
623 A.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Del. 1993) {allowing the adoption of a gay lover in part to 
facilitate estate planning.); 333 East 53rd St. Assocs. v. Mann, 121 A.D.2d 289 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 512 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1987) (permitting adoption of one eld-
erly woman by another for purposes of establishing succession rights to rent-con-
trolled apartment); In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) 
(approving adoption of an adult male by his male lover). 
89. See Martin, supra note 86, at 17-18. Other reasons cited for the decline in 
marriages include changing attitudes toward marriage caused by low employment 
rates for males, high labor force participation for women, and couples' fear that the 
marriage will end in divorce. See Mauldon, supra note 34, at 333-36. 
90. See generally Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 129 {defining marriage as 
"a relationship in which one's sense of self is constituted in part through connection 
with another"). 
1998] FAMILY VALUES AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 87 
from marrying. In addition, among those in the lower socio-economic 
classes, unmarried cohabitation appears to have been common for 
some time.91 Likewise, as American life expectancy increases, many 
widowed, older Americans increasingly are choosing to live together 
to reduce living expenses, but not to marry, if marriage would cause 
them to lose retirement or other governmental benefits.92 Notwith-
standing a change in social attitude and acceptance of these informal 
marriages,93 courts still remain somewhat hesitant when asked to en-
force contracts that attempt to impose marriage-like duties on unmar-
ried parties, or to compensate cohabitants for activities traditionally 
associated with legal marriages.94 
Ill. BENEFITS AWARDED BASED ON MARITAL STATUS 
An examination of the current interpretation and application of 
bankruptcy laws reveals a disparity in the way in which married and 
unmarried couples are treated. This part scrutinizes non-bankruptcy 
benefits awarded on the basis of marital status, as well as bankruptcy 
benefits awarded to married and unmarried debtors. Despite their 
limited utility to creditors and debtors, status-based considerations 
continue to play a significant role in bankruptcy laws. 
A. Non-Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of 
Marital Status 
Notwithstanding the dramatic changes in the nature and perma-
nency95 of spouses' relationships to each other, state and federal laws 
91. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 193; Stuart J. Stein, Common Law 
Marriage: Its History and Certain Comemporary Problems, 9 J. Fam. L 271, 293 
(1969); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal ofTrentls 
in Family Organization, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 88 (1960). 
92. See Lani Luciano, Money Helps: Answers 10 Your Questions, Money, Sept. 
1997, at 181, 182 (reflecting fear that remarrying will jeopardize the receipt of a for-
mer spouse's social security benefits); Melynda Wilcox, Lol'e & Money, Senior Style, 
Kiplinger's Pers. Fin., Oct. 1, 1996, at 83, 83 (referencing a study by the American 
Association of Retired Persons which notes an increase in midlife and older citizens 
cohabiting as unmarried couples because of a fear that they will lose survivor benefits 
if they marry); see also Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 365 (suggesting that 
cohabitation is the "preferred option for some once-married middle-aged and older 
persons" who fear losing survivors' benefits from an earlier marriage). 
93. In response to the increasing number of cohabiting, unmarried employees, a 
number of municipalities and companies have adopted domestic partner initiatives to 
extend some benefits to the partners of their employees. See infra notes 182, 189-96 
and accompanying text. The popular media also has discussed the changing nature of, 
and the difficulties of addressing, non-traditional families and unmarried cohabitants. 
See Letitia Baldridge, Letitia Baldridge's Complete Guide to the New Manners for 
the '90s 182-85 (1990) (discussing the legalities of living together, how to address co-
habiting couples, and how to structure cohabiting household); Elizabeth L Post, Em-
ily Post's Etiquette 165-73 (15th ed. 1992) (same). 
94. See Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 122-23. 
95. See supra note 13. 
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continue to provide benefits to protect and promote marriage. States 
continue to believe that the rights to property and economic support 
that flow from a legal marriage decrease the likelihood that wives and 
children will become wards of the state if the parents divorce.96 Thus, 
encouraging marriage is still believed to be necessary to protect the 
state fiscally.97 Because of the view that encouraging marriage ulti-
mately yields economic (and perhaps emotional) gains that exceed the 
cost of awarding marriage based benefits, married couples continue to 
receive favorable treatment under both federal and state laws. 
For example, under federal tax laws, spouses have the right to file a 
joint tax retum98 and the ability to reduce certain gift99 and estate 
taxes.100 They also have the right to receive certain federal entitle-
ments that are granted based on marital status (including social secur-
ity benefits),101 and they receive favorable privileges in immigration 
decisions.102 Spouses have the right under state laws to sue for loss of 
consortium and for wrongful death, 103 and the right not to be forced 
to testify against each other in criminal proceedings.104 State laws also 
give spouses the right to receive property from each other when one 
dies intestate105 and in many states, spouses can rely on state laws to 
96. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1180 n.78, 1181 n.82; see also Mich. 
Comp. Laws.§ 551.1 (West 1998) (defining marriage as a unique relationship between 
a man and a woman and expressing the state's "special interest in encouraging, sup-
porting, and protecting that unique relationship in order to promote, among other 
goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children"). 
97. See generally Prince, supra note 79 (discussing public policy limitations on co-
habitation agreements). 
98. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1994). 
99. See id. § 2001(d) (adjustment for gift tax paid by spol!se). 
100. See id. § 2056(a) (allowance of marital deduction). 
101. See, e.g., Federal Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 
U.S.C. § 402(b)-(c) (1994) (providing benefits to homemaker spouse at retirement of 
long-employed spouse); id. § 402(e)-(f) (providing benefits to a surviving spouse upon 
death of an employee spouse); id. § 416(a) (defining spouse and surviving spouse); id. 
§ 416(b) (defining "wife"); id. § 416(c) (defining "widow"); id. § 416(f) (defining 
"husband"); id. § 416(g) ("defining widower"); see also id. § 416(h)(1) (establishing 
factors to be used for determining family status). 
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994) (exempting immigrant spouses of United States 
citizens from certain visa restrictions). 
103. See Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580 (Michie 1997); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-612 
(West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-4-2 (Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-107 
(1997). 
104. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-227 (1995) (giving a spouse the option to testify, 
but not compelling testimony); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-423 (1994) (same); Md. Code 
Ann .. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106 (Supp. 1997) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2162 
(Supp. 1998) (same); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1997) (same); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 546.260 (West 1998) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 8-57 (1986) (same); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann.§ 5913 (West Supp.1998) (same); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§ 5.60.060 (West Supp. 
1998) (same). 
105. Each state has a statutory provision that provides, in substantial part, that a 
surviving spouse is entitled to receive a share of the deceased spouse's estate even if 
the spouse dies intestate. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 13500 (West 1991) (giving a 
spouse the right to property when the other spouse dies intestate); N.Y. Est. Powers 
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shield their assets from individual creditors by owning property as ten-
ants by the entirety.106 In addition to receiving quantifiable state and 
federal benefits, married couples receive certain status-based entitle-
ments, including the right to visit each other in hospitals and in jails.107 
Fmally, although many unmarried workers have successfully con-
vinced both public and private employers to extend employee benefit 
coverage to their non-spouse partners, 108 in most instances only mar-
ried employees receive workplace employee benefits for their 
dependents.109 
B. Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded to Married and 
Unmarried Debtors 
Although bankruptcy laws are designed to regulate debtors' eco-
nomic affairs with their creditors, and not their sexual affairs with 
their significant others, the Code grants several benefits to debtors 
based solely on their decision or ability to marry. That bankruptcy 
laws give married debtors benefits denied to unmarried debtors is not 
surprising, as other federal and state laws discriminate in favor of mar-
ried couples.U0 Likewise, because bankruptcy laws generally reflect 
social norms and values,111 it is not surprising that bankruptcy laws 
favorably treat people in "traditional" marriages.112 Although it is 
& Trusts § 5-1.1-A (McKinney Supp. 1997) (same); Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 38 (b) 
(West 1980 & Supp. 1998} (same); Va. Code Ann.§ 64.1-1 (Michie 1995) (same). 
106. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text. 
107. See Abigail Goldman, Gays Rally Support for Right to Marry, LA. limes, Feb. 
13, 1998, at BS. 
108. For a discussion of domestic partner ordinances and initiatives, see infra notes 
189-94 and accompanying text. 
109. See, e.g., Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1194 n.152 (discussing pro-
posed ruling designed to prevent discrimination on the basis of marital status in the 
provision of health insurance benefits); Howard Pianka & Dean L Silverberg, Do-
meslic Partller Benefits On The Rise.· What Are The Legal And Tax Issues?, N.Y. W., 
Nov. 17, 1997, at 53 (recognizing that "[e]mployers are facing increasing pressure to 
extend benefits to their employees' domestic partners"). 
110. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text. See generally Chambers, supra 
note 76, at 472-74 (listing burdens and benefits conferred on married but not unmar-
ried couples). 
111. Many of the exceptions to discharge found in 11 U.S.C. § 523 can be justified 
only on the basis of public policy. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. II 
1996) (excepting alimony and child support); id. § 523(a)(6) (excepting debts for will-
ful and malicious injury); id. § 523(a)(8) (excepting student loans); id. § 523(a)(9) (ex-
cepting debts arising out of drunk driving). In addition, in response to a number of 
bankruptcy filings by airlines, Congress amended § 365 of the Code to make it more 
difficult for airlines to perform under certain airport leases. See id. § 365(d)(5)-(9). 
Fmally, after one particularly infamous bankruptcy case involving a CEO who admit-
ted he filed a bankruptcy to enhance the company's bargaining power \vith a union, 
Congress amended § 1113 of the Code to require a company to satisfy additional pro-
cedural hurdles before being allowed to reject a collective bargaining agreement. See 
id. § 1113. 
112. For an early view of traditional marriages, sec George F. James, The Income of 
Married Couples: Is the Knwson Bill Justice?, Taxes, Apr. 1948, at 311, 366 ( .. It must 
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quite unlikely that any given debtor could take advantage of all mari-
tal benefits in a single case, 113 Congress should examine whether 
granting status-based benefits is consistent with the goals of a federal 
system designed to regulate a debtor's obligations to third-party 
creditors.114 
The following sections discuss several bankruptcy benefits all mar-
ried debtors receive (even if they are not economically dependent on 
each other) but no unmarried couples receive (even if they are eco-
nomically linked).U5 It seems clear that Congress does not grant mar-
ital benefits to debtors in order to promote or protect marriage. 
Instead, Congress grants most marital bankruptcy benefits for reasons 
that have nothing to do with the desire to encourage marriage. As I 
detail below, Congress provides some benefits as a matter of adminis-
trative convenience and provides others to ensure that debtors' and 
creditors' rights in state-created property interests are the same under 
state and federal bankruptcy laws. Indeed, Congress generally recog-
nizes a debtor's marital status simply to avoid the expense and time of 
requiring married couples to prove that they are economically linked. 
In discussing two benefits made available to both married and unmar-
ried economically linked couples, I conclude this part by arguing that 
status-based benefits are not consistent with bankruptcy policy and 
goals because they create an over and under-inclusive system. 
1. Joint Filing 
Section 302 of the Code gives married couples the right to file a 
joint bankruptcy petition.U6 Congress awards this right to facilitate 
be recognized that the basic American social pattern is still that of married couples 
living together, the husband being the principal or sole wage earner, and the wife's 
major contribution being the management of the home and the care of children."). It 
is doubtful whether the husband-in-marketplace, wife-at-home paradigm actually was 
a "tradition" for all groups in society. See Williams, supra note 22, at 2282 n.282 (pos-
iting that the "tradition" encompassed only Protestants); see also supra notes 33-34 
(discussing wartime and black wives' nontraditional roles). 
113. For example, debtors can shield community property under 11 U.S.C § 524 
only in the nine community property states. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 
(1997) (discussing community property states); In re Brollier, 165 B.R. 286, 289 n.4 
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994) (listing Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin as community property states). 
114. If the debtor owes a former spouse debts incurred during a divorce, bank-
ruptcy policy should consider the debtor's marital relationship because the ex-spouse 
would be a creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (stating that debts in the nature of 
alimony and child support are non-dischargeable in all bankruptcy cases). But see id. 
§ 523(a)(15) (stating that other divorce-related debts may be dischargeable in Chap-
ter 7 liquidation cases). 
115. I discuss these benefits in another article and conclude that, if Congress per-
sists in granting benefits based on marital status it should also impose burdens on 
spouses (including the duty to help repay debts). See Dickerson, supra note 16. 
116. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not provide for joint fil-
ings because married women historically could not incur debt separately or own sepa-
rate property and, thus, there was no need for them to file for bankruptcy protection 
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case administration, not to promote marriage or to encourage spouses 
to support each other. The scant legislative history of § 302 suggests 
that Congress believed that most married couples are jointly liable on 
their debts and jointly hold most of their property.ll7 Although Con-
gress assumed that most married couples are jointly obligated and 
jointly own property, even married couples who have no joint debts or 
assets or who live apart are allowed to file a joint petition.118 Having 
assumed that married couples are economically linked, Congress al-
lowed cases to be jointly administered to obviate the need for married 
debtors to hire two attorneys and pay two filing fees. 
Legal fees and costs involved with bankruptcy filings can be daunt-
ing-especially when one remembers that debtors (by definition) gen-
erally have limited funds. Thus, allO\ving economically linked married 
debtors to save expenses is reasonable.119 In addition to reducing out-
of-pocket expenses, allowing a married couple to file a joint case 
reduces the administrative costs of having two related cases proceed 
through the same court at the same time \vith two separate trustees 
potentially evaluating the same debts and assets. Fmally, allmving ec-
onomically linked married debtors to file a joint petition potentially 
reduces the amount of time each must spend in court (and thus, must 
miss from work) since courts can excuse one spouse from fully partici-
pating in the bankruptcy case if the attending spouse can provide all 
relevant financial information for the absentee spouse.120 
But while allowing economically linked married debtors to file a 
joint petition makes sense and is administratively efficient, there is no 
reason why this benefit should be extended to all married debtors, yet 
to discharge their debts or protect their property. See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 439 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). 
117. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprillled in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5818. 
118. See In re Colwell, 208 B.R 85, 85 (Bankr. S.D. Aa. 1997) (allo\\ing a legally 
separated married couple who had lived apart for over three years and who had no 
joint debts or assets to file a joint petition). 
119. Debtors currently must pay $130 just to commence a case and $45 in adminis-
trative fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930{a)(1) {1994). Legal fees in Chapter 7 cases range 
from $200 to $500. Telephone Interview with Debera Conlon, Assistant U.S. Trustee, 
Eastern District of VIrginia (Jan. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Conlon Inteniew]; see also In 
re Crivilare, 213 B.R 721, 723 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1997) (obsening that the average fee 
in Southern District of Illinois is $500). Attorneys' fees in a basic Chapter 13 case 
range from $800 to $1,500. Conlon Interview, supra; see also In re Raffle, 216 B.R. 
290,296 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (capping fees in "vanilla" Chapter 13 case at S1,200); 
In re Lee, 209 B.R. 708,709 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting that the maximum fee for 
Chapter 13 case was $800); In re Taylor, 100 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (re-
ducing an award to $970 in a Chapter 13 case). 
120. See In re Keiser, 204 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996). Although the 
court in Kaiser acknowledged the local practice of excusing one spouse from attend-
ing the meeting of creditors required by § 341 of the Code, the court dismissed the 
bankruptcy case of the non-attending spouse. /d. As the court noted, however, the 
dismissal (indeed the entire controversy) primarily was a "struggle of \\ills" between 
the United States Trustee's Office and the couple's attorney. /d. 
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denied to all economically linked unmarried ones. Indeed, the cases 
involving economically linked unmarried debtors who have attempted 
to file a joint petition illustrate the inconsistency of limiting the right 
to file a joint petition to married couples. For example, the debtors in 
In re Allen121 were a gay couple who sought to file a joint Chapter 13 
petition.122 Without considering whether the debtors were linked eco-
nomically, or whether state marriage requirements violated the Due 
Process or Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion,123 the court refused to allow the joint petition because the debt-
ors were not "spouses" as defined by the Code. 124 The court stressed 
that since its holding applied to all unmarried couples, whether heter-
osexual or homosexual, it was not unfairly discriminating against 
same-sex couples.125 While implicitly recognizing that refusing to 
grant a gay couple a marriage license might be a violation of equal 
protection, the court refused to decide that issue. Instead the court 
opined that if the debtors were "truly interested in pursuing their right 
to enter into a legally recognized marriage," they should pursue their 
legal remedies in state court.126 
A mother and daughter with joint medical debts relating to injuries 
the daughter received in a car accident attempted to file a joint peti-
tion in In re LamP7 The debtors argued that "judicial (and debtor) 
economy would be served by allowing the joint or co-filing."128 The 
court concluded that joint filings are appropriate only where there is 
an "identity" of assets and debts that warrants allowing two separate 
entities to participate in one case.129 The court refused to allow the 
mother and daughter to file jointly because they only shared some 
joint debt, did not live together, and did not own joint assets.130 The 
court reached this conclusion even though spouses can file a joint peti-
tion even if they shared no joint debts, lived apart, and owned no joint 
assets. 
In two cases where unmarried couples lived together, shared living 
expenses, owned property together, and, in one case, raised children 
together, courts still refused to permit a joint filing because the debt-
121. 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995). 
122. See id. at 771. 
123. See id. at 774 
124. See id. at 773. With the recently enacted Defense of Marriage Act, bankruptcy 
courts currently cannot allow a gay couple to file jointly unless they find the Act to be 
unconstitutional. 
125. Id. at 774. 
126. Id. 
127. 98 B.R. 965, 966 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). 
128. Id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id.; see also In re Jackson, 28 B.R. 559, 564 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (deny-
ing joint filing for parents and child). 
1998] FAMILY VALUES AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 93 
ors were not spouses within the meaning of the Code.131 While the 
courts indicated their willingness to jointly administer the cases after 
they were filed, this would not obviate the initial requirement that 
both debtors hire an attorney and both pay a filing fee. Indeed, the 
one court that has permitted an unmarried couple to file jointly al-
lowed the filing only because the debtors were ex-spouses.132 Ac-
knowledging that the divorced debtors technically were not spouses, 
the court relied on the legislative history of § 302 to conclude that 
allowing these ex-spouses to file a joint Chapter 13 petition was con-
sistent with bankruptcy policy.133 
Since Congress allows joint filings to facilitate the administration of 
what it assumes are economically linked debtors (i.e., a husband and 
wife), it is unclear why this benefit should not be extended to any 
economically linked debtors, whether married or not. Allowing all 
married couples (even those who do not share debts and assets) to file 
a joint petition but denying that right to all unmarried couples (even if 
they can show they actually have merged their financial lives) makes 
no sense if Congress views joint filings as vehicles to simplify the pro-
cess of administering the estates of economically linked debtors. Al-
lowing all economically linked couples to file jointly would be 
consistent \vith bankruptcy policy because the savings in legal and fil-
ing fees could be given either to the debtors (to protect their fresh 
start) or to creditors (to repay debts). Moreover, because the deter-
mination to allow a joint petition would examine the debtors' eco-
nomic (not personal) relationship, courts could allow joint filings 
without becoming embroiled in a constitutional determination of 
whether states may deny certain legal rights to people simply because 
of the their marital status.134 
2. Property Held as Tenants by the Entirety 
The Code also gives married debtors the right to shield property 
held as tenants by the entirety from their creditors because it incorpo-
rates the favorable status states accord entirety property.135 Relying 
131. See In re Malone, 50 B.R. 2, 3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985): In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5, 
6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). 
132. See In re Pipes 78 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). 
133. See id. at 983 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 321 (1977). reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6277). 
134. The Defense of Marriage Act suggests that Congress now believes it necessary 
to protect the institution of formal heterosexual marriages. See supra notes 1, 6; infra 
note 201. Because I suggest later that any unmarried couple-whether same sex lov-
ers, unmarried male and female lovers, a parent and child, or siblings-be allowed to 
file jointly if they can establish that they are an "economic unit," permitting unmar-
ried couples to file jointly would not threaten the institution of marriage or require 
federal bankruptcy or district courts to recognize any type of informal marriage. See 
infra Part IV. 
135. Congress allows states to determine whether debtors may rely on state or fed-
eral exemptions to keep property from creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994). 
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on state entirety laws is consistent with the bankruptcy laws' "fresh 
start" policy because those laws were designed to prevent one 
spouse's separate creditors from seizing all marital assets and using 
those assets to pay that spouse's debts.136 Because the tenancy de-
pended on the legal fiction that man and woman merged at mar-
riage, 137 historically the tenancy required that: (1) each spouse have a 
right of survivorship in entirety property; (2) the spouses acquire the 
same interest in the property by the same instrument at the same 
time; and (3) the spouses have an undivided interest in the entire 
property.138 
More than half of the states prevent debtors from using the federal exemptions and, 
instead, require debtors to exempt property pursuant to applicable state laws. See 4 
Collier on Bankruptcy 'li 522.02(1], at 522-13 (Lawrence P. King et a!. eds., 15th ed. 
1996). Debtors who either live in states that have opted out of the federal bankruptcy 
exemptions or choose to rely on state law to exempt property may exclude tenant by 
the entireties property from their bankruptcy estates and thus prevent the trustee 
from using that property to satisfy creditor claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
136. Yzenbaard, supra note 27, at 102-04. 
137. See Powell, supra note 44, 'li 620(3]. 
138. See Janet D. Ritsko, Comment, Lien Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the 
Entirety After Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, 30 New Eng. L. Rev. 85, 
92-95 (1995). Though modern entirety laws have changed somewhat since the com-
mon law, modern laws (1) maintain the right of survivorship; (2) prevent entirety 
property from being subject to partition; and (3) prevent spouses from disposing of 
any part of entirety property or using the property to pay individual debts without the 
consent of the other spouse. See Benjamin C. Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Prop-
erty and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 701, 703 (1980). Ten-
ancy by the entirety laws have existed in forty states. Several states abolished the 
tenancy because it conflicted with community property laws or perpetuated the now 
outdated view of marriage as merger. See Section on Real Property, Probate, and 
Trust Law, American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on Changes in Substantive 
Real Property Principles 82 (1944). Estimates of the number of jurisdictions in which 
the tenancy is still recognized range from as few as seventeen to as many as thirty-
seven. See Powell, supra note 44, 'li 620[4]; Ritsko, supra, at 87 n.16; see, e.g., Alaska 
Stat. §§ 34.15.140(c), 34.15.110(b) (Michie 1996) (confirming the right of tenancy by 
the entirety); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-317 B (Michie 1998) (discussing dissolution of 
tenancy by the entirety); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, 309 (1989) (recognizing tenancy by 
the entirety); D.C. Code Ann.§ 45-216 (1996) (creating the presumption of tenancy in 
common unless expressly stated otherwise); Fla. Stat. §§ 689.11, 689.15 (West 1994) 
(recognizing tenancy by the entirety); Haw. Rev. Stat.§§ 509-1,509-2 (1993) (constru-
ing tenancy in common as the default formation, but recognizing tenancy by the en-
tirety); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1005nc (West 1993) (unpholding tenancy by the 
entirety); Ind. Code Ann. § 32-4-2-1 (Michie 1995) (recognizing tenancy by the en-
tirety); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 381.050 (Michie Supp. 1996) (creating a tenancy in com-
mon unless the right of survivorship is expressly mentioned); Md. Code Ann. Real 
Prop. § 4-108 (1996) (recognizing tenancy by the entirety); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, 
§ 8 (Law Co-op. 1996) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 552-102, 557-71, 557-81, 
557-101 (West 1998) (detailing procedures and particulars for tenancy by the en-
tirety); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 6-2.2(b) (McKinney 1992) (creating a pre-
sumption of tenancy by the entirety between husband and wife); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 39-13.3(b), 39-13.6(b) (1984) (same); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 74 (West 1994) (rec-
ognizing tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy as the grantor may elect); Or. Rev. 
Stat.§ 108.090 (1990) (discussing creation and dissolution of estates by entireties); 23 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 3507 (West 1991) (dictating that in cases of divorce, tenancy by 
the entirety becomes tenancy in common); R.I. Gen. Laws§ 34-11-3 (1995) (recogniz-
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Despite the potential harm to individual creditors, states enacted 
entirety laws to ensure that, notwithstanding one spouse's financial 
difficulties, a married couple could keep their basic family assets (par-
ticularly the family home) and avoid being forced into poverty.139 
Under most state laws, only creditors \vith a claim against both 
spouses may reach entirety property.140 Thus, unless state law allows 
individual creditors to reach entireties property,141 if only one spouse 
files for bankruptcy, the debtor can keep or "exempt" entirety prop-
erty and prevent separate creditors from satisfying their debts \vith the 
entirety property.142 
ing tenancy by the entirety); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-1-109 to -110 (1993) (permitting 
tenancy by the entirety); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 67 (1989) (upholding tenancy by the 
entirety); Va. Code Ann. § 55-21 (Michie 1995) (maintaining the right of survivorship 
when it "manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument" that survivorship was 
intended); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-140 (Michie 1997) (permitting the creation of a 
tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy without a strow person). 
139. The policy justification for state homestead Jaws is also to shield basic family 
assets from the reach of creditors. Homestead acts allow a householder to designate a 
house and land as his homestead and then exempt the homestead from execution by 
the owner's creditors. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 207 B.R. 878, 881 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1997) (noting that Minnesota homestead exemption laws are designed to prevent the 
"destitution and dependency of families, and of promoting their stability, self-suste-
nance, and independence over the generations"); Kingman ''· O'Callaghan, 57 N.W. 
912, 915 (S.D. 1894) ("The object of all homestead legislation is to protect the home, 
to furnish shelter for the family, and to promote the interest and welfare of society 
and the state by restricting ... alienation or encumbrance by the owner's sole act and 
deed."); George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 Harv. L Rev. 1289, 1289 n.4 
(1950) (citing Act of Jan. 26, 1839, (1838-40) Laws of the Republic of Tex .• 3d Cong., 
1st Sess. 113). Homestead property is exempt (up to varying dollar amounts) from 
execution for certain kinds of debts. These dollar amounts vary greatly. mnging from 
an unlimited amount in some states to a much more modest amount in others. Com-
pare Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 222.01 (West 1998) (discussing the homestead exemption), ancl 
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.001 (West 1984) (unlimited homestead exemption), with 
Ga Code Ann.§ 44-13-1 (Supp. 1998) (limiting homestead exemption to S5,000), and 
Va. Code Ann.§ 34-4 (Michie 1996) (same). 
140. See In re Oberlies, 94 B.R. 916, 923 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (noting that 
under Michigan law, a trustee could administer entirety assets for the benefit of joint 
creditors); In re Townsend, 72 B.R. 960 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); Ackerly, supra note 
138, at 702-03. In addition to preventing commercial creditors from collecting debts, 
it is estimated that in 1995 over 250,000 parents who were obliged to pay child support 
effectively shielded assets from child support recipients by creating entireties estates. 
See Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy By Tlze Emirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified 
Safe Haven For Delinquem Child Support Obligors, 29 Val. U. L Rev. 1057, 1092 
(1995). 
141. Several jurisdictions continue to permit only joint creditors to reach entirety 
property. See John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Emirety, in 4 Thompson on Real Prop-
erty § 33.07(e) n.111 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994 & Supp. 1997). 
142. Entirety property is deemed "destroyed" only when both the husband and 
wife acting jointly file a joint petition and effectively "convey" the property to the 
trustee. Only if destroyed would the property be available to all creditors (joint and 
separate) on an equal basis under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B). See Gmnt v. Himmel-
stein, 203 B.R. 1009, 1013 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); see also Community Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Persky, 893 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1989); Kirschenbaum''· Feola, 22 B.R. 81, 
85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (declaring§ 522(b)(2)(B) a "nullity" in New York). 
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Even if the debtors could not exempt entirety property, the Code 
currently curtails a trustee's ability to sell non-exempt entirety prop-
erty. 143 A trustee ordinarily has the power to sell a debtor's property 
free and clear of any other interest as long as the co-owner con-
sents.144 The trustee can only sell entirety property, however, if it can 
be shown that: (1) the property cannot easily be partitioned; (2) sell-
ing only the estate's interest would yield significantly less than selling 
the property free of the non-debtor spouse's interest; and (3) the ben-
efit (to the debtor's bankruptcy estate) of selling the home outweighs 
the harm to the non-debtor spouse.145 Because selling a family home 
often causes extreme harm to a non-debtor spouse (especially a home-
maker spouse), trustees often fail to satisfy the third requirement and, 
thus, cannot sell the entirety property.146 Finally, while courts have 
not fully resolved when entirety property can be sold or how to gener-
ally treat entirety property when a non-filing spouse is present, 147 
most courts conclude that a trustee cannot sell either the debtor's or 
143. See In re Siegel, 204 B.R. 6, 9 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that a trustee's 
ability to sell entireties property raises a "myriad of difficult issues" and that this 
ability may be "subject to both statutory and constitutional limitations"). 
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(2) (1994). 
145. See id. § 363(h)(1)-(3). The trustee also must give the non-filing spouse the 
right of first refusal. See id. § 363(i). 
146. Trustees fairly easily satisfy the first two requirements. Because most entirety 
property is the family home, it is often difficult to partition the home effectively. See 
Berland v. Gauthreaux, 206 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Bakst v. Griffin, 123 
B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); Neylon v. Addario, 53 B.R. 335, 338 (D. Mass. 
1985). Likewise, because many state laws limit the estate's interest in the entirety 
property to the right of survivorship, trustees easily show that selling the undivided 
interest in the entireties property would realize significantly less for the estate than 
selling the property free and clear of the non-debtor's interest. See Galllhreaux, 206 
B.R. at 505; Armstrong v. Trout, 146 B.R. 823, 829 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992). Because 
courts frequently consider non-economic factors when valuing the "detriment" to the 
non-debtor spouse if the trustee is allowed to sell the family home, trustees frequently 
fail to satisfy the third requirement. See Persky, 893 F.2d at 20-21 (noting that a non-
debtor spouse is unlikely to find new home for minor children); Gauthreaux, 206 B.R. 
at 505-06 (non-debtor spouse contributed all money to purchase property and would 
incur substantial tax consequences if property was sold); Siegel, 204 B.R. at 7 (holding 
that a sale would deprive a wife of her home of 22 years and would not produce 
proceeds adequate to acquire comparable residence); In re Waxman, 128 B.R. 49, 53 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that a wife had strong family and religious ties to 
the community); Salem v. Coombs, 86 B.R. 314, 316 (D. Mass. 1988) (noting a co-
owner's physical disabilities). See generally Price v. Harris, 155 B.R. 948, 950 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1993) (citing supporting cases). 
147. Compare In re Shaw, 5 B.R. 107, 111 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that 
courts cannot sell a non-debtor's interest unless the debtor's entire interest in the 
property was part of the estate), with In re Dawson, 10 B.R. 680, 687 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn.1981) (explaining that while a court can sell a debtor's right of survivorship, the 
right is typically worth little and sale would not be allowed because of harm to non-
debtor spouse resulting from sale). 
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non-debtor spouse's interest in entirety property unless a creditor ex-
ists who has a joint claim against both spouses.148 
Laws permitting property owners to exempt property (including en-
tirety property) initially had the same policy consideration as bank-
ruptcy laws, i.e., to preserve small, sentimental items of property and 
to prevent families from sinking into poverty.149 State laws that allow 
debtors to hold potentially extravagant real or personal property as 
tenants by the entirety,150 however, no longer appear consistent with 
the policy objectives of bankruptcy laws. Moreover, allowing married 
couples to rely on state entirety laws unavailable to unmarried couples 
creates both an over- and under-inclusive system. It is over-inclusive 
because it allows all married debtors to exempt entirety property even 
if they live apart, do not have joint debts, or (other than owning en-
tirety property) appear to have separate economic lives. It is under-
inclusive because no unmarried debtor can shield entirety property 
from creditors even if the debtor and another person own property 
jointly, have joint debts, and have merged their lives economically. 
For example, a debtor who is a widower with three minor children, 
or a debtor who cohabits with his lover and their children, cannot hold 
property as tenants by the entirety under state law and, thus, cannot 
shield it from creditors in bankruptcy. Unless he can rely on a state 
homestead law to exempt the property, the debtor cannot shield his 
property from creditors even if he desires to protect his family's home 
or if losing that home forces him and his children into poverty. Simi-
larly, an elderly couple may own a home together but choose not to 
marry for fear of losing social security or other retirement benefits. 
Though resembling a married couple in all aspects other than holding 
148. See In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38,40-41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997); cf. In re Lashley, 
206 B.R. 950,952 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (stating that a debtor has the right to avoid 
a creditor's lien on entireties property even though the creditor has a joint judgment 
against both debtor and non-debtor spouse); In re Himmelstein, 203 B.R. 1009, 1014 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (ruling that a claim must be reduced to judgment). 
149. See In re Ellingson, 63 B.R. 271,277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (noting that 
exemptions further social policies of giving debtors property necessary to survive, 
protecting debtors' dignity and cultural and religious identity, giving debtors a chance 
to rehabilitate and earn future income, protecting debtors' families from impoverish-
ment, and shifting the burden of supporting debtors from society to creditors). See 
generally Alan N. Resnick, Prudellt Planning or Fraudulem TraiiSfer? The Use of 
Nonexempt Assets to Purd1ase or Improve Exempt Property otJthe Eve of Ba11kntptcy, 
31 Rutgers L. Rev. 615, 620-27 (1978) (discussing the origin and development of ex-
emption laws and the policies exemption Jaws should further). 
150. See, e.g., In re Garner, 952 F.2d 232, 233 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that a couple 
owned over 6000 shares of stock held as tenants by the entirety}; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 
531 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ark. 1975) (promissory notes); Weathersbee v. Wallace, 686 
S.W.2d 447, 450 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (certificates of deposits}; Colclazier v. Col-
clazier, 89 So. 2d 261,264 (Fla. 1956) (corporate stock); Jones v. Jones, 270 A2d 126, 
128 (Md.1970) (citing a case in which a motor boat was held by a couple as tenants by 
the entirety); Cohen v. Goldberg, 244 A.2d 763, 764 (Pa. 1968) (savings accounts); I11 
re Estate of Holmes, 200 A.2d 745, 746-47 (Pa. 1964) (stocks); 111 re McEwen's Estate, 
33 A.2d 14, 15 (Pa. 1943) (beneficial interest in a trust). 
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a state-issued marriage license, this couple could not own their home 
as tenants by the entirety even though losing their home could send 
them into poverty. Finally, elderly siblings or an elderly parent and 
child may choose to pool their assets, live together, and save expenses 
but could not shield their property from creditors even though their 
economic lives may be merged. 
Because the Code relies on state laws, Congress understandably al-
lows only legally married couples to claim entirety property as ex-
empt. Congress is not required, however, to recognize this tenancy in 
bankruptcy merely because state law recognizes the tenancy. 151 
Throughout the Code, Congress has elected to either modify or ignore 
debtors' and creditors' state-created property interests if doing so fur-
thers the substantive goals of federal bankruptcy laws.152 While bank-
ruptcy courts generally should adopt state law definitions of property 
interests to avoid forum shopping, 153 bankruptcy laws exist to create a 
unified federal collection system that operates independent of the va-
garies and inconsistencies of various state laws.154 Thus, while Con-
151. See In re Jeffers, 3 B.R. 49,56 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980) ("There is no doubt that 
Congress can, through its constitutional authority to establish 'uniform laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,' change state-created property 
rights."); see also Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 10 (1931) (concluding that "the Bank-
ruptcy Act ... is superior to all state laws upon the subject"). But see Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (requiring bankruptcy courts to interpret laws in a way 
that prevents a party from receiving a windfall simply because the dispute is resolved 
in a federal bankruptcy court, rather than a state court (quoting Lewis v. Manufactur-
ers Nat'! Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
152. For example, the trustee has the right under 11 U.S.C. § 544 to avoid liens as a 
"hypothetical creditor" even though none of the debtor's creditors actually could 
avoid the lien under state law. In addition, the Code gives trustees the right to avoid 
certain pre-petition transfers as preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547 even though there 
is no state law analogue to § 547. Finally, the Supreme Court, in United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209-12 (1983), concluded that the IRS was required 
to return property of the debtor that it seized pre-petition even though the debtor 
would have no right to force the IRS to return the property under applicable state 
law. 
153. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (emphasizing that, absent countervailing federal 
interests, courts should adopt a state's definition of property interests). For a general 
discussion of the need to prevent forum shopping in bankruptcy disputes, see gener-
ally Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply 
to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 825-28 (1987), and Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: 
A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 97, 100-01 (1984). 
154. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated 
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) ("Even where Congress has not completely 
displaced State regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law."); In re Baker, 35 F.3d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that federal bankruptcy preemption is more likely to occur where a state stat-
ute makes an exception out of the Bankruptcy Code or where the statute is concerned 
with economic regulation rather than the protection of the public health and safety); 
In re Di Giorgio, 200 B.R. 664, 669 (D. Cal. 1996) ("The Supremacy Clause invali-
dates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law . . . . " (quoting 
Baker, 35 F.3d at 1353)). 
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gress may choose to recognize state-defined property rights, there is 
no constitutional or statutory requirement that federal bankruptcy 
laws adopt state law characterizations of property. Conversely, Con-
gress is not constitutionally or statutorily prohibited from giving un-
married debtors additional protections in property even if state law 
does not favorably treat such property.155 
The fact that Congress allows married debtors to rely on state laws 
to shield entirety property from creditors is not unreasonable. Be-
cause doing so unfairly discriminates against unmarried debtors \vith-
out clearly promoting marriage, however, there is no theoretical 
justification for continuing to grant this status-based benefit. Indeed, 
it is unclear why Congress continues to look to state laws in shaping 
the Code, given the difficulties lower courts have faced when forced to 
interpret and apply those laws.156 Congress may recognize entirety 
laws because it does not want to give creditors protections in bank-
ruptcy that are not available under state laws and to prevent forum 
shopping. It cannot be said, however, that this promotes marriage. If 
Congress recognizes entirety laws because it concludes that having a 
place to live is consistent \vith bankruptcy's "fresh start" policy, this 
fresh start should protect the homes of all debtors, whether they are 
married, single, economically linked or not. In short, whether bank-
ruptcy laws recognize entirety laws either to discourage forum shop-
ping or to protect the fresh start, it cannot reasonably be argued that 
recognizing these laws promotes marriage or that bankruptcy laws 
should promote marriage. 
3. Expenses for Non-Debtor Spouse 
In states that permit debtors to use federal bankruptcy exemptions 
to keep property,157 a debtor can treat the non-debtor spouse as a 
"dependent" and exempt both property that his "dependent" spouse 
uses as a residence158 and, in addition, a limited amount of jewelry and 
professional supplies the "dependent" spouse uses.159 Because the 
term "dependent" is defined to include a spouse "whether or not actu-
155. For example, federal bankruptcy exemptions allow debtors to exempt up to 
$15,000 in value in real property the debtor or the debtor's dependent uses as a resi-
dence. See 11 U.S.C § 522(d)(l) (1994). To provide at least some benefits to non-
homeowners, the Code allows debtors who did not usc the full $15,000 exemption to 
use up to $7,500 to exempt any property. See id. § 522(d)(5). More than half of the 
states prevent debtors from electing to use these exemptions. See Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 135, at 522-23 n.4a. This exemption, however, is available when 
applicable for non-homeowners even if they would not be entitled to exempt property 
under applicable state law. 
156. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
157. The report prepared by the National Bankruptcy Re,iew Commission pro-
poses that Congress enact uniform federal exemptions. See National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission, supra note 12, at 121-24. 
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(l), (d)(1). 
159. See id. § 522(d)(4), (6). 
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ally dependent,"160 debtors can exempt this property without proving 
either that the non-filing spouse cannot afford to purchase those items 
with the non-filer's own income or that the non-filer is in any way 
economically dependent on the debtor. Similarly, debtors may treat 
their non-debtor spouses as dependents and include the spouses' ex-
penses in the budget they prepare in their Chapter 13 cases.161 While 
many courts consider a non-filing spouse's income as well as expenses 
when considering the amount of "reasonably necessary" expenses a 
Chapter 13 debtor can include in a proposed budget, 162 the Code does 
not require that non-debtor spouses prove that they are incapable of 
paying their own expenses (by, for example, earning wages outside the 
home or finding a higher-paying job) or that they are economically 
dependent on the debtor. Finally, debtors may treat their non-debtor 
spouses as dependents when claiming a right to exempt certain retire-
ment income that is "reasonably necessary" for the debtor's or 
spouse's support.163 
If a debtor provides all (or nearly all) the financial support for a 
non-debtor, the non-debtor's expenses should be considered during 
the debtor's bankruptcy case even if the parties are not married. Be-
cause there is no general definition for "dependent,"164 and the one 
definition the Code provides is not exclusive, it is at least conceivable 
that a cohabitant could be construed as a "dependent" if her cohab-
iting partner filed a bankruptcy petition. For a number of reasons, 
however, cohabiting partners probably would not be treated as each 
other's dependents. First, courts historically have been reluctant to 
grant benefits to unmarried couples if those benefits are ones that are 
160. !d. § 522(a)(1). 
161. See id. § 1325(b)(2)(A). 
162. Chapter 13 debtors must disclose their spouses' income on their bankruptcy 
schedules. See Schedule I, Form Six, Current Income of Individual Debtor(s). 
Although no statutory authority requires this, courts routinely consider the non-
debtor spouse's income when deciding whether a debtor has committed aU disposable 
income to funding a Chapter 13 plan. See In re Mathenia, 220 B.R. 427 (Bankr. W.D. 
Okla. 1998); In re Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 511-12 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); In re Harmon, 118 
B.R. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990); In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 561-62 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. 1989); In re Smith, 98 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (citing In re Kern, 40 
B.R. 26, 28-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)); In re Strong, 84 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. 1988); In re Saunders, 60 B.R. 187, 188 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Se11ers, 33 
B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). Creditors often argue that it is unfair to a11ow 
debtors to use separate income for family necessities unless the court considers the 
extent to which the non-filing spouse's income would remain "disposable" to the 
debtor, but uncommitted to the plan. See In re Soper, 152 B.R. 985, 988 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 1993). Courts also consider the non-debtor spouse's income when deciding 
whether a debtor's student Joan should be discharged because it would be an "undue 
hardship" to force repayment. See In re Lezer, 21 B.R. 783, 789 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
1982); In re Bagley, 4 B.R. 248, 249 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980). 
163. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). See Ve/is, 123 B.R. at 512 (discussing§ 522(d)(10) 
and referring to the "Bankruptcy Code fiction that a non-debtor spouse is a depen-
dent of the debtor spouse regardless of actual dependency"). 
164. See 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
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typically associated with marriage.165 Second, just as people in com-
mon law marriages find it difficult to prove the existence of their mar-
riage,166 cohabiting partners would have a difficult time convincing a 
bankruptcy court that they should be treated as dependents since they 
probably have no legal duty to support each other. Third, bankruptcy 
courts may be reluctant to extend bankruptcy protections to non-legal 
dependents, given their general un\villingness to allow debtors to 
avoid paying debts simply because the debtor wants to support a non-
legal dependent.167 Finally, since the Defense of Marriage Act makes 
it abundantly clear that Congress wants to restrict marriage benefits 
only to those who have a state-issued license, it is quite possible that 
bankruptcy courts would be hesitant to interpret "dependent" to in-
clude a cohabiting partner. 
If a debtor has agreed to support her non-filing cohabitant and the 
non-filer is actually dependent on the debtor, courts should not ignore 
the cohabitant's expenses in the debtor's bankruptcy case. Neverthe-
less, bankruptcy courts conceivably could adopt a narrow interpreta-
tion of the term "dependent" and find that it includes only a spouse, 
child, or other person who has a legal relationship with the debtor. If 
courts adopt such a definition, the Code would again be both over and 
under-inclusive because an unmarried debtor could not exempt prop-
erty used by her actually dependent cohabitant or include her cohabi-
tant's expenses in her budget even though a married debtor could 
exempt property used by her financially independent husband and 
could include his expenses in her Chapter 13 budget. 
4. Benefits Available to Cohabitants 
At least two benefits that most likely were designed to protect non-
debtor spouses currently are available to non-debtor cohabitants. 
Creditors of a Chapter 12 or 13 debtor generally cannot attempt to 
165. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
167. For example, the debtors in In re Ridmzond, 144 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 
1992), sought relief in Chapter 7 because they could not afford both to repay their 
debts in a Chapter 13 plan and to provide support to members of their extended 
fanllly. See id. at 540-41. The court dismissed the Chapter 7 case, finding that the 
debtors had no duty to support family members who are not their legal dependents. 
See id. at 542; see also In re Davidoff, 185 B.R. 631, 635-36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) 
(dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in part because the debtor intended to support his 
adult children and his second \vife's child even though his wife received substantial 
child support payments from the child's biological father); In re Bacco, 160 B.R. 283, 
289 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in part because the 
debtor proposed to pay a debt for which his father also was liable): In re Peluso, 72 
B.R. 732, 738 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition because the 
debtor willingly incurred additional monetary obligations including his proposal to 
subsidize the automobile insurance and the monthly telephone charges of his emanci-
pated, employed son). 
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collect consumer debts168 from anyone who is jointly liable with the 
debtor until the Chapter 12 or 13 case is closed, dismissed, or con-
verted to a Chapter 7 or 11 case.169 Thus, if the co-signor acted as a 
guarantor and received no direct benefit as a result of the debt, Con-
gress temporarily170 insulates debtors from the indirect pressure they 
might feel if creditors pursued innocent friends or relatives who co-
signed the debt as a favor to the debtor.171 Because this benefit is not 
limited to spouses or dependents, creditors would also be prevented 
from collecting a debt co-signed by a debtor's non-marital partner 
(unless the partner was the actual beneficiary of the debt). Similarly, 
the Code allows debtors to repay co-signed consumer debts at a 
higher rate than other debts.172 Courts allow this because they believe 
that this treatment increases the likelihood that the debtor will devote 
all future income to making plan payments, rather than attempting to 
protect a friend or loved one by trying to find a way to both make plan 
payments and to repay the co-signed debt in full. 173 
Since Congress did not restrict co-signor protections to spouses, the 
bankruptcy system at least implicitly concedes that a debtor may have 
an economic relationship with a person who is not a spouse or depen-
dent and that creditors and debtors may benefit if the debtor is al-
lowed to protect a non-spouse co-signor. Given this, the fact that 
most benefits currently available to a debtor's spouse do not appear 
designed to protect or promote marriage, and the fact that awarding 
168. A consumer debt is defined as a debt incurred primarily for personal, family, 
or household purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(8). 
169. See id. § 1301(a)(2). Creditors are allowed to collect the debt if (1) the co-
debtor became liable on the debt in the ordinary course of her business, (2) the debt 
was actually designed to benefit the co-debtor, (3) the debtor's Chapter 13 plan docs 
not propose to pay the creditor in full, or (4) the creditor would be irreparably 
harmed if it is not allowed to collect the debt. See id. § 1301(a)(1), (c)(1)-(3); see also 
id. § 1201(a) (co-debtor protection in Chapter 12 family farmer cases). 
170. Creditors can petition the court to have the automatic stay lifted to enable 
them to collect the debt from the co-obligor and, in any event, can pursue the co-
obligor for any deficiency amount if the debtor does not fully repay the creditor. See 
id. § 1301(c). 
171. See In re Case, 148 B.R. 901, 902 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); H.R. Rep. No. 95-
595, at 426 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5811. 
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1); In re Chapman, 146 B.R. 411,416 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1992); In re Damon, 103 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Todd, 65 B.R. 249, 
253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Perkins, 55 B.R. 422, 425-26 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 
1985). Indeed, courts have confirmed plans that repaid joint unsecured debts in full 
while giving other unsecured debts less than 10%. See, e.g., Spokane Ry. Credit Union 
v. Gonzales, 172 B.R. 320,328 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that co-signed debts 
may be classified separately from other unsecured debts); Dornan, 103 B.R. at 62 
(same). But see In re Battista, 180 B.R. 355, 357 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (refusing to 
confirm plan that paid co-debtor claims in full but paid other unsecured claims only 
six percent). 
173. See Battista, 180 B.R. at 357; In re Martin, 189 B.R. 619, 627-28 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 1995); Gonzales, 172 B.R. at 328-30; In re Cheak, 171 B.R. 55, 57-58 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ill. 1994); In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948, 956 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987); Todd, 65 B.R. at 
252-53; Perkins, 55 B.R. at 425-26. 
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most marital benefits creates a flawed over and under-inclusive sys-
tem, bankruptcy laws should be revised to award benefits \vithout re-
gard to marital status. 
IV. AWARDING BANKRUPTCY BENEFITS BASED ON ECONOMIC, 
NoT MARITAL, RELATIONSHIPS 
Because many of the legal distinctions between married and unmar-
ried couples have largely disappeared,174 Congress should revise the 
current bankruptcy system to ensure that it awards benefits based on 
the economic, rather than the marital, relationship between two indi-
viduals. Just as tax scholars have noted when discussing whether mar-
ried couples should be granted favorable tax benefits,175 little 
174. For example, wives can now sue their husbands for assault and battery and 
spouses can be prosecuted for rape. See State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Aa. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984) (holding that a spouse could be prosecuted for sexual battery upon the 
other spouse); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985) (holding that there is no 
implicit marital exemption for rape and aggravated sodomy); People v. De Stefano, 
467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983) (declaring that a rape statute that grants 
husband immunity from prosecution would violate the equal protection clause of state 
and federal constitutions); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 1984) 
(affirming a spousal rape conviction because a wife revoked her implied consent to 
marital sex). In addition, unmarried couples can now legally have sex in all but thir-
teen states and the District of Columbia, which still maintain their fornication stat-
utes. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1002 (1996) (making fornication punishable by 
$300 fine or six months imprisonment or both); Ga. Code Ann.§ 16-6-18 (1996) (de-
fining fornication as a misdemeanor); Idaho Code § 18-6603 (1997) (prohibiting un-
married people of the opposite sex from having sexual intercourse); 720 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/11-8 (West 1993) (making fornication punishable as a Class "B" misdemeanor); 
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 18 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (making fornication punishable by 
imprisonment of not more than three months or fine not more than $30); Minn. Stat. 
Ann.§ 609.34 (West 1987) (defining fornication as a misdemeanor); Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 97-29-1 (1994) (making fornication punishable by not more than $500 fine and im-
prisonment for not more than six months); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-10-2 (Michie 1994) 
(warning fornicators to cease and desist); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-184 (1993) (defining 
fornication as a Class "2" misdemeanor); N.D. Cent. Code§ 12.1-20-10 (1997) (defin-
ing fornication as a Class "B" misdemeanor); S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 
1985) (making fornication punishable by fine of $100-$500 or imprisonment for six to 
twelve months or both); Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-104 (1995) (defining fornication as a 
Class "B" misdemeanor); Va. Code Ann.§ 18.2-344 (Michie 1996) (defining fornica-
tion as a Class "4" misdemeanor); W.Va. Code§ 61-8-3 (1997) (making fornication 
punishable by fine of not Jess than $20). 
175. Several authors have advanced arguments concerning the significance of mari-
tal status in income taxation. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and rlze 
Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389 (1975); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Srams as a 
Factor In Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1980}; Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joim Income Ta:c 
Return, 45 Hastings LJ. 63 (1993); Daniel J. Lathrope, Stare-Defined Marital Stallls: 
Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 257 (1983); Edward J. 
McCaffery, Sloud1ing Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Marker Efficiency, 
and Social Change, 103 Yale LJ. 595, 617-19 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation 
and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L 
Rev. 983 (1993); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax 
Tzme.· Marital Status as a Tax Detenninanr, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 773 (1989); Jeanette An· 
derson Wmn & Marshall Winn, Till Death Do We Split: Married Couples and Single 
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empirical evidence exists to determine the extent to which married 
couples are justifiably entitled to bankruptcy benefits because they 
share income or debts.176 Without citing any empirical evidence, 
many bankruptcy courts, like Congress, make decisions based on their 
assumption that married couples maintain a joint household. 177 Given 
the temporal nature of many marriages,178 and the statistical 
probability that fifty percent of all marriages will end in divorce, 179 it 
is increasingly unlikely that modern marriages will be "traditional" 
ones where the spouses pool and share all income, own all assets 
jointly, and are jointly liable for all debts. Indeed, since most marital 
unions consist of two market wage-earners, 180 spouses (especially 
higher income ones) in some marriages may choose to have com-
pletely separate financial lives.181 Conversely, the drastic increase in 
the number of unmarried, cohabiting couples, some of whom may 
choose to have interlocking economic lives, further suggests that 
Persons Under the Individual Income Tax, 34 S.C. L. Rev. 829 (1983); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (1994). 
176. Kornhauser, supra note 175, at 80. Many family law scholars assume that 
spouses share at least some financial resources and that spouses presume that they 
will pool their funds. See Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 51, at 2385-86 
nn.390-94. 
177. See, e.g., In re Carter, 205 B.R. 733,736 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing the 
"reality that married couples live as a unit, pooling their income and expenses"); In re 
Berndt, 127 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1991) ("As husband and wife ... the 
Debtor and his non-joining spouse maintain a joint household and most of their living 
expenses are, as is typical, incurred in that fashion without segregation or regard as to 
which spouse consumed the benefit."); see also Chambers, supra note 76, at 470-71 
(observing that laws providing favorable treatment to married couples "build on be-
liefs or guesses about the economic relationships that married persons actually have 
and on prescriptive views about what those relationships ought to be"). 
178. See Fineman, supra note 22, at 4 (describing marriage as the "most tenuous, 
least permanent, of our intimate relationships that is afforded the most significant and 
privileged position in both public and private institutions-subsidized on both ideo-
logical and economic levels"); see also Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1179-80 
(1992) (describing marriage as having an "indeterminate duration" (quoting Homer 
H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States§ 2.1, at 30 (2d ed. 
1987))). 
179. See supra note 13. 
180. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 22 (Ct. App. 1993) (Poche, J., 
dissenting) ("For better or worse, we have to a great extent left behind the comforta-
ble and familiar gender-based roles evoked by Norman Rockwell paintings."). See 
generally Steven Mintz, New Rules: Postwar Families, in American Families: A Re-
search Guide and Historical Handbook 184 (Joseph M. Hawes & Elizabeth I. Nybak-
ken eds., 1991). 
181. See Schmuckler, supra note 75, at 364. One comprehensive study of gay and 
straight married and unmarried couples concluded that only those couples who be-
lieved their marriages would last forever completely merged their lives financially. See 
Philip Blumstein & Pepper Schwartz, American Couples 103-05 (1983). 
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awarding public-or private182-benefits based on marital status183 is 
no longer justified.184 
While one bankruptcy court was willing to assume, for limited pur-
poses, that (1) a debtor, his cohabitant, and their children were a fam-
ily unit, (2) he could claim expenses for her, and (3) her income 
should be considered when calculating his income,185 it is unclear 
whether unmarried couples actually share living expenses and jointly 
own assets at a rate equal to or greater than married couples.186 In-
deed, the limited available empirical evidence suggests that most un-
married couples do not pool their assets because they realize that they 
generally cannot rely on state laws to protect them if they need to 
disentangle their lives.187 According to the most comprehensive sur-
vey of the economic relationships of married and unmarried couples, 
182. Bank of America, one of the nation's largest financial institutions, recently 
extended health benefits to its employees' extended families. By allowing employees 
to designate a spouse, unmarried partner, sibling, or parent (up to age 65) as a benefit 
recipient, the company acknowledged that many employees support families that in-
clude more than just their spouses and their children. See Edmund Sanders, B of A 
Offers Partners and Extended Families Benefits, Orange County Reg., Mar. 12, 1997, 
at C4; see also Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. App. 
1985) (detailing insurance dispute involving same-sex couple who lived together for 
over 12 years, had joint bank accounts, were named as the primary beneficiary in each 
other's wills and insurance policies and otherwise "shared the common necessities of 
life"); Brinikin v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., No. 796 271, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 27, 1987) (detailing bereavement leave dispute involving same sex couple 
who lived together and shared expenses). See generally Robert L Eblin, Domestic 
Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay 
Couples (and Others), 51 Ohio. St. LJ. 1067,1078-79 (1990) (discussing steps taken by 
an employee to secure benefits for his domestic partner}. 
183. See generally Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 39-41 (discussing the de-
clining importance of status}; Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 688-
93 (discussing increasingly tolerant judicial attitudes toward informal relationships); 
Schneider, supra note 50, at 1820 (discussing the change in the nature of the moral 
discourse in fantily law). 
184. Denying benefits to unmarried debtors may especially burden women, many 
of whom have a shared financial relationship \vith people other than spouses. See 
Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 198-99 (observing that the lower-class black 
fantily has frequently been characterized as an extended matriarchal family which 
emphasizes blood, not conjugal, relationships); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking De-
pendency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2181, 2190 (1995) 
(discussing the role of the extended family in the African-American community); 
Karen Gross, Re-Vzsion of the Bankmptcy System: New Images of lndil•idual Debtors, 
88 Mich. L. Rev. 1506, 1552 (1990) (noting that bankruptcy law fails to recognize the 
changing nature of the American family structure); see also Special Comm. on Gen-
der, D.C. Cir. Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, Report of the Special 
Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic 
Bias (1996) (noting that access to bankruptcy protections may be denied to some indi-
viduals because of the Code's restrictions on the types of couples who are allowed to 
file a joint bankruptcy petition), reprinted in 84 Geo. U. 1657, 1758 n.145. 
185. In re Bicsak, 207 B.R. 657, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997). 
186. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 684-97 (dis-
cussing the emerging trend of cohabiting couples). 
187. See Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 181, at 97. 
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gay couples pool their money only when their relationship is a long-
term one-such as marriage-which they believe will last forever.tss 
As a matter of bankruptcy policy, however, it is irrelevant whether 
it is statistically likely that married or unmarried couples in fact share 
income or debts. "Marital" benefits should be awarded to an unmar-
ried couple only if the couple has established by objective evidence 
that they are an "economic unit." Once they prove they are a unit, 
they should be entitled to all benefits currently awarded only to mar-
ried couples. To accomplish this, I propose that Congress amend the 
Code as follows: First, § 101, the Code's definitional section, should 
be amended to include the term "economic unit," defined as a public 
or private arrangement between members who have a committed rela-
tionship involving shared financial responsibilities. The term "depen-
dent" should also be added to § 101 and should include within its 
definition a member of an economic unit. Section 302 should be 
amended to permit a joint case to be commenced by the filing of a 
petition by both members of an economic unit. Finally, solely for the 
purposes of exempting property or preventing a trustee from selling 
property, a home owned by an economic unit should be treated as 
entirety property-even though the unit could not characterize the 
property as entirety property under applicable state law. 
To determine what type of proof is sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of an economic unit, bankruptcy courts could rely on the stan-
dards and tests state courts, municipalities, and private employers 
have used when deciding whether an unmarried person is entitled to 
receive benefits as the "domestic partner" of a person who is entitled 
to certain public or private benefits.189 For example, when deciding 
whether a non-spouse was entitled to certain benefits under a rent 
control law, the New York Court of Appeals examined the following 
factors: the exclusivity and duration of the partners' relationship; 
their families' knowledge of the relationship; the existence of joint as-
sets such as bank accounts, safe deposit boxes and credit cards; and 
188. See id. at 105-06. 
189. The following municipalities have adopted such laws: Berkeley, San Fran-
cisco, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood, California; Denver, Colorado; Chicago, Illi-
nois; Baltimore and Takoma Park, Maryland; New York, New York; Arlington, 
Virginia; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin. Massachusetts, New York 
and Vermont also provide limited domestic partner benefits for state workers. In 
addition, the following companies and organizations also have extended employee 
benefits to unmarried cohabitants: Advanced Micro Devices, American Express, Ap-
ple Computer, Inc., Bank of America, Boston Globe, Coors Brewing Co., Democratic 
National Committee, Dow Chemical Co., Eastman Kodak, Holland & Knight, IBM 
Corporation, Levi Strauss, Microsoft, New York Times, Northern Telecom, Perot Sys-
tems, St. Petersburg Times, Seattle Times, Time-Warner, Vinson & Elkins, and Walt 
Disney Co. See Democrats Give Health Benefits to Gay Couples, N.Y. Times, May 17, 
1997, at All; Good News for Partners of Unmarried Employees, Wash. Post, Apr. 19. 
1997, at B1; Mark Hansen, Bolstering Benefits, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1988, at 32; Diana 
Kunde, Perot Systems Offers Health Benefits to Employees' Partners, Dallas Morning 
News, Dec. 14, 1996, at 1F; Sanders, supra note 182. 
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whether the partners named each other as beneficiaries in life insur-
ance policies.190 Municipalities have adopted a number of definitions 
and qualifications to determine whether a "domestic partner" is enti-
tled to health coverage. For example, one jurisdiction requires the 
partners to show that they are unmarried adults who have lived to-
gether continuously for at least one year and "who have a close and 
committed personal relationship involving shared responsibilities."191 
Several ordinances require partners to assert that they share the com-
mon necessities of life, that they are jointly responsible for their basic 
living expenses, and that they are generally responsible for each 
other's welfare.192 At least one municipality also requires partners to 
swear that they intend to remain together indefinitely.193 Many mu-
nicipalities require partners to register as domestic partners.194 
If a couple satisfies such a test, they should enjoy marital benefits 
irrespective of whether they are in a publicly or privately arranged 
relationship.195 While adopting some of these tests may in fact pre-
vent some married couples from being treated as economic units, 
adopting a test that more accurately reflects a couple's economic reali-
ties would help to eliminate the uncertainty concerning who is eligible 
to receive benefits based on their involvement in an economic unit.196 
190. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989). 
191. Berger, supra note 15, at 424 (citing New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123 
(Aug. 7, 1989)). Several domestic partner ordinances have similar requirements. See 
id. at 423-26. 
192. See Berger, supra note 15, at 425 (discussing the Santa Cruz, California domes-
tic partnership ordinance); Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1193 (quoting Los 
Angeles, California and Seattle, Washington ordinances). 
193. See Berger, supra note 15, at 432 (discussing Santa Cruz domestic partnership 
ordinance). In discussing these ordinances, Bowman & Cornish suggest that employ-
ers grant benefits to any person in a domestic partnership as long as both partners are 
"responsible for the support of the other" and would limit the definition of support to 
the types of items that historically would have been covered by the Doctrine of 
Necessaries, i.e., food, clothing, a suitable residence, and medical attention. See Bow-
man & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1206. These authors would also make a party who 
fraudulently applied for domestic partnership benefits liable for the value of the bene-
fits received as well as reasonable attorney's fees. See id. at 1211. 
194. See Berger, supra note 15, at 424-25 (discussing filing requirements of Santa 
Cruz and New York). 
195. The court in In re Fisdzel, 103 B.R. 44 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), refused to 
confirm a Chapter 13 plan that would be funded by the debtor's significant otlter even 
though the debtor and significant other lived togetlter, pooled income, and had some 
joint debts. Id. at 49. Under my proposal, the plan should be confirmed just as courts 
routinely confirm Chapter 13 plans funded by non-debtor spouses. See In re Antoine, 
208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a non-debtor wife is permitted 
to fully fund plan of her unemployed husband). For a discussion regarding how fam-
ily law destroys the marital model and collapses all sexual relationships into a private 
category that should not be sanctioned, privileged, or preferred by law, see Fineman, 
supra note 22, at 5. 
196. Rather than imposing a numerical requirement, Congress could give courts the 
discretion to determine the boundaries of "substantial" just as courts currently have 
the discretion to decide if a married couple's assets are so intert,vined that their cases 
should be substantively consolidated. For example, the district court in Austin Bank 
108 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
Moreover, because debtors would rely on public, objective evidence in 
proving they are an economic unit, this test would reduce transaction 
costs for both debtors (who must prove they are an economic unit) 
and creditors (who can quickly determine whether a potential bor-
rower is part of an economic unit). While it may be easier to deter-
mine dependency under current law since unmarried couples are 
never treated as dependants, such a rule would facilitate dependency 
determinations among married debtors. That is, if a creditor objects 
to a debtor's attempt to characterize a spouse as a "dependant" de-
spite their status as married, the couple is still required by the Code to 
prove their dependency in court. 
Some might argue that giving an economic unit the right to claim 
benefits currently available only to married debtors potentially ex-
pands the rights unmarried debtors would have under state law. 
Notwithstanding this risk, there are a number of reasons why award-
ing benefits based on a couple's economic relationship is preferable to 
the current treatment of unmarried couples. 
First, awarding bankruptcy benefits to all economic units is consis-
tent with the assumption that some marital benefits (most notably the 
right to file a joint petition) should be awarded to spouses because 
they are jointly liable on their debts and jointly hold most of their 
property.197 Extending the right to file jointly to unmarried economic 
units would further bankruptcy policy by eliminating duplicate filing 
and attorney's fees, thereby reducing administrative expenses and al-
lowing those funds to be used for either the debtor's fresh start or 
debt repayment. Unlike the subsidies associated with most benefits 
awarded based on marital status, awarding bankruptcy benefits to un-
married couples would have little, if any, adverse economic impact on 
the government coffers198 yet would protect both the debtor's fresh 
v. Chan, 113 B.R. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision grant-
ing the debtors' motion to consolidate their estates. See id. at 429. The bankruptcy 
court found that 85% of the couple's assets were jointly held and that the debtors' 
affairs were too intermingled to be separated. See id. While affirming the decision to 
allow the couples assets to be substantively consolidated, the district court noted that 
the "degree of intermingling and obscurity [also] might have supported an order de-
nying consolidation." !d. 
197. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5818. 
198. Extending the benefits married people receive from the government (includ-
ing tax benefits and certain retirement entitlements) would, in most cases, entail addi-
tional costs if those benefits are extended to their unmarried partners. Likewise, 
private benefits typically available only to married employees include employee 
health benefits, the right to take unpaid leave to care for a spouse, and reduced family 
memberships at health clubs or recreational facilities. See, e.g. Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387 
(1994)) (outlining criteria for family and medical leave). Extending those benefits to 
members of an economic unit also would entail additional costs. In contrast, award-
ing benefits to all economic units most likely poses no additional costs to creditors or 
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start and the creditor's desire to be repaid as much of the debt as 
possible. 
Second, allowing debtors to provide for expenses of their economic 
partner is consistent with the policy supporting the Code's treatment 
of dependents. Congress most likely allowed debtors to take into ac-
count the economic needs of their dependents (even if not actually 
dependent) because it assumed that married couples are economically 
linked, or that the person in the family who incurred the debts is also 
the one who earns the income. Permitting a debtor either to exempt 
property used by, or to budget for the expenses of, the economically 
dependent member of the unit is consistent with the paradigm of the 
economic provider being allowed to budget for a non-debtor depen-
dent. Moreover, treating a member of an economic unit as a depen-
dent is consistent \vith the Code's literal definition of dependent, 
which includes, but is not limited to, a spouse.199 
Finally, because my proposal disregards marital status,200 Congress 
could award benefits to a debtor's lover, cohabitant, or common law 
spouse yet not be required to recognize same sex or common law 
marriages.201 
Granting marital benefits to economic units would further bank-
ruptcy policy \vithout expanding a debtor's property rights under state 
law. For example, if a mother/daughter economic unit were sued in a 
state court, they would be precluded from arguing that their home was 
entirety property exempt from seizure, because they are not married 
to each other. Under my proposal, they could treat the home as en-
tirety property in a bankruptcy proceeding even though they could not 
shield the property from creditors in a state court collection action. 
Because the proposal might expand the debtor's right to exercise cer-
tain state property interests in bankruptcy, it may cause some eco-
nomic units to choose a bankruptcy forum to resolve their disputes 
the government and has the additional benefit of facilitating the administration of the 
two related bankruptcy estates. 
199. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(l) (1994} ('"[D]ependent' includes spouse, whether or 
not actually dependent."). 
200. Cf. \VIlliam A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rig/us of Unmarried Cohabi-
tants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 La. L Rev. 1677, 1716 (1984} 
(arguing that legislation creating a status of "lawful cohabitation" would avoid litiga-
tion over whether cohabiting couples should be viewed as married when awarding 
federal benefits). See generally Fineman, supra note 22, at 228-30 (arguing for aboli-
tion of marriage as a legal category and with it any privilege based on sexual affilia-
tion in fanlily law and replacing the status relationship with contract, propeny, ton, 
and criminal law doctrines). 
201. By ignoring marital status altogether, bankruptcy courts can avoid the horror, 
so feared by the supporters of the Defense of Marriage Act, of fanning "(t]he flames 
of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, [and] the flames of self-centered morality ..• 
licking at the very foundation of our society: the family unit." 142 Cong. Rec. H7482 
(daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr); see also Berger, supra note 15, at 
451 (arguing that domestic partnership laws "should strive to protect alternative fam-
ily arrangements" as opposed to marriage, which is "a distinct and separate goal"). 
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with creditors.2°2 Despite the potential for forum shopping, Congress 
should allow economic units (whether married or unmarried) to treat 
their home as entirety property in a bankruptcy proceeding because 
preventing creditors from foreclosing on a debtor's home is consistent 
with bankruptcy policy. Moreover, as discussed in part III.B.3, if Con-
gress has determined that having a place to live is consistent with the 
fresh start married debtors need, there is no theoretical justification 
for limiting the scope of the fresh start simply because the people who 
inhabit the home are not married. 
Adopting a functional, economic approach to awarding bankruptcy 
benefits is not devoid of risks. First, it requires courts to exercise dis-
cretion when deciding whether a couple has sufficiently demonstrated 
that it is an economic unit.203 Allowing courts to exercise such discre-
tion may cause some uncertainty and potentially increase administra-
tive costs by requiring an economic unit determination in virtually all 
cases involving couples in formal or informal marriages. Evaluating 
whether a couple is an economic unit, however, should be a relatively 
simple task for bankruptcy courts. First, debtors would be required to 
submit objective evidence (i.e., deeds, bank statements, loan docu-
ments, wills, insurance policies, etc.) to prove that they are members 
of an economic unit. Moreover, courts are already authorized to per-
form a similar analysis when deciding whether to combine the assets 
of married couples who file jointly. 
That is, while filing a joint petition causes the couple's separate es-
tates to be jointly administered, it does not require courts to combine 
their assets.Z04 Combining, or "substantively consolidating," estates is 
the procedure bankruptcy courts use to place the assets of more than 
one debtor (or a debtor and a non-debtor) in one joint pool, thereby 
giving the creditors of one debtor the right to satisfy their claims from 
the assets of another.Z05 While Congress assumed that most married 
couples have joint debts and assets, it recognized that some do not 
and, accordingly, gave courts the discretion to decide whether the 
spouses' assets and liabilities should be combined into a single pooJ.2°6 
202. Just as the Code currently attempts to give at least some benefits to homeown-
ers and non-homeowners by allowing the latter group to exempt an additional 
amount of personal property because they have no homestead to exempt, see 11 
U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), (d)(5), the Code could allow both married and unmarried debtors 
to exempt a homestead in bankruptcy even if they could not do so under applicable 
state law. 
203. See Kornhauser, supra note 175, at 71 (raising same concerns when deciding 
whether a non-marital economic unit nevertheless should be treated as a taxable 
unit). 
204. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b). 
205. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Reider (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (discussing differences between joint administration and substantive 
consolidation). 
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (giving courts the discretion to "determine the extent, if 
any, to which the debtors' estates shall be consolidated"); see also J. Stephen Gilbert, 
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Because courts consider whether the spouses' assets and debts are 
substantially intertwined before consolidating the cases, bankruptcy 
courts already perform the type of test I propose, albeit in another 
context.207 If courts are competent to determine whether spouses' as-
sets and debts are intertwined, they can also determine whether co-
habitants' assets and debts are intertwined. 
Finally, to alleviate any concern that giving unmarried couples mari-
tal benefits \vill dramatically increase the number of people seeking 
those benefits, Congress can always erect a high threshold that re-
quires, for example, a shmving that more than 75 percent of their as-
sets or debts are joint.208 Having a high joint debt/asset threshold 
would have the secondary benefit of alleviating creditor concern that 
giving benefits to unmarried couples unfairly alters their rights ex ante. 
That is, creditors might argue that it is unfair to force them to subsi-
dize the debtor's choice to become economically entangled with some-
one other than a legal spouse because the creditor insured against 
subsidizing only spouses recognized under applicable state law.209 
Modem credit practices substantially undermine this argument. Any 
prudent creditor would know that a debtor is a member of an eco-
nomic unit because an economic unit, by definition, would own a sub-
stantial number of joint assets and have substantial joint debts. A 
simple credit check, which any reasonable creditor would perform, 
would disclose that the potential borrower is financially linked to 
someone else.210 Moreover, once bankruptcy laws are changed to 
Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43 Vand. L Rev. 207.231 (1990) 
(discussing a two-step approach used to decide whether cases \\ill be consolidated). 
207. See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436,441 n.10 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1994); In re Chan, 
113 B.R. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Steury. 94 B.R. 553, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); 
In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103, 106 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Scholz, 57 B.R. 259, 262 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); Ohio v. Wilkinson (In re Winston), 24 B.R. 474 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Barnes, 14 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981). 
208. While adopting a very high threshold or adopting the test used by the court in 
Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49, 54-55 (N.Y. 1989), would reduce the 
number of unmarried couples who would qualif)' as an economic unit. it also may 
prevent some married couples from receiving the benefits. 
209. See Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accoumams' Liability to Third Par-
ties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Seardz for a New Limiting Principle, 30 Am. 
Bus. LJ. 345, 423 (1992) ("If a third party creditor ... knows ex ame that there is a 
risk that the business to which it trusts its funds ... may become judgment-proof; the 
third party can assess that risk and adjust the terms of its loan ... accordingly."); see 
also Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Namre of Bankruptcy: An Essay 
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155 (1989) (urging 
courts to distinguish uses of bankruptcy that further the ex ante bargain and those that 
further the interests of only one group). 
210. Most loan and credit card applications ask the potential borrower to disclose 
joint debts. For larger loans, lenders require debtors to complete a full financial state-
ment that lists all assets and debts. See Letter from F. John Dwyer, Jr., Senior Vice 
President, The Old Point National Bank to A. Mechele Dickerson, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, the College of William and Mary (May 15, 1996) (on file with author). 
Even if a debtor does not disclose this information, lenders who enter into a secured 
transaction involving real estate routinely check land records to confirm property 
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award benefits to all economic units, creditors will adjust their prac-
tices and will protect themselves from adverse bankruptcy treatment 
when they determine that a potential borrower is in an economic rela-
tionship with someone else. 
CoNCLUSION 
Many Americans may continue to believe that the only legitimate 
relationship between unrelated adults is one that is sanctioned by a 
marital tie.Z11 As the choice to marry is a non-economic right,212 how-
ever, and bankruptcy laws are designed to regulate a debtor's eco-
nomic rights, bankruptcy laws should not be used to either promote or 
reject this private, non-economic choice.213 While bankruptcy laws 
are often used to respond to public policy issues,214 to facilitate debt 
repayment, and to protect debtors rights to a fresh start, Congress 
should grant marital benefits to any type of unit that functions eco-
nomically like a married couple.215 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric used during the debate over the De-
fense of Marriage Act,216 awarding bankruptcy benefits based on an 
economic rather than a marital association is consistent with the 
Code's goals and policies. Adopting this proposal would not, how-
ever, force courts to recognize informal marriages or otherwise be-
come entangled in state family law. Indeed, by ignoring marital status 
altogether and instead examining economic involvement, Congress 
can avoid deciding whether recognizing informal marriages demeans 
or otherwise denigrates the institution of heterosexual marriage217 and 
ownership. Moreover, creditors often confirm information obtained from a credit ap-
plicant by contacting the applicant's references and employers and by requesting a 
report from a consumer reporting agency. Where a joint applicant is involved, a cred-
itor usually obtains a report on the joint applicant as well. See Federal Regulation of 
Consumer Credit 'li 2.04[2], at 2-32 to 2-33 (American Bar Association Young Lawyers 
Division ed., 1981). 
211. Professor Martha Fineman has argued that even those who believe that di-
vorced mothers and their children or long-term unmarried cohabitants can constitute 
a "family" may still consider single motherhood to be "deviant." Fineman, supra note 
22, at 147. 
212. This "right" is, of course, made available only to people who choose to marry 
someone of the opposite sex. 
213. See generally Kandoian, supra note 82 (arguing that the social approval of 
marriage and marriage-like relationships affects the legal regulation of marriage). 
214. See supra note 111. 
215. For a persuasive argument that a sexual relationship between individuals 
should not be used to determine whether the individuals constitute a "family" or nrc 
entitled to benefits awarded only to families, see Fineman, supra note 22, at 143-66. 
See also In re Allison, 209 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997) (concluding that a disabled, 
alcoholic debtor, his unemployed adult welfare recipient daughter, and his grand-
son-who had severe allergies-should be treated as a household because they pool 
their family resources to survive). 
216. See supra note 6. 
217. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (III. 1979) (expressing concern 
that allowing a cohabitant to recover contract damages after the cohabiting relation-
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can move bankruptcy laws closer to the reality of how modem couples 
govern their lives both inside and outside of marriage.218 
ship terminated would make cohabitation an attractive alternative to marriage and 
contravene the State's desire to preserve the integrity of marriage); see also Reppy, 
supra note 200, at 1683-85 (arguing that allowing cohabitants to obtain legal marriage 
benefits will demean marriage); cf. Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 
692 (observing that historical response to cohabitation was to pretend it was marriage 
and then attempt to attribute to it the legal incidents of marriage). 
218. Cf. Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 227 (arguing for treating marriage as 
a contract because it "allows couples to formulate an agreement that conforms to 
contemporary social reality" not the "outdated framework of traditional legal mar-
riage"); Shultz, supra note 51, at 333 (arguing that contractual ordering in modem 
marriages is necessary because marriage as "a social institution ... has outgrown the 
legal structure that used to govern it"). 
